Key words:
effectiveness, input scheme, communal farmers, agricultural inputs, Zimbabwe,
free distribution, dependency syndrome, corruption, market
Definitions
Effectiveness- he degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to
which targeted problems are solved. Effectiveness is determined without reference to
costs. It is doing the right thing
Communal Farming-
are various types of agricultural
production in which multiple farmers run their holdings as a joint
enterprise. This type of collective is often an agricultural cooperative in
which member-owners engage jointly in farming activities.
Mechanisation-is the process of changing from working
largely or exclusively by hand or with animals to doing that work with
machinery.
The
Zimbabwean government has over the years strived to expand its agricultural
production through agricultural mechanisation and the agricultural input
scheme. The government has identified
communal farmers as key towards reviving the agriculture sector which is on the
road to recovery since the government embarked on the fast track land
resettlement programme (FTLRP) in 2000. Therefore, through agriculture mechanisation
and input schemes there has been acquisition of farming inputs and use of
tractors by arable crop farmers in communal and resettlement state land
delineated during the period following the launch of the FTLRP. The
agricultural input scheme in particular has been seen by the government of
Zimbabwe as the most effective way of empowering communal farmers over the
years. The government has since independence put in implemented several input
schemes namely the Winter Crop Input Scheme, Agriculture Sector
Productivity Enhancement facility (ASPEF),
the Crop and Livestock Credit Input scheme. These schemes there were put in place with a noble cause of empowering
communal farmers and bridging the gap in agriculture production following the
land redistribution programme in the year 2000. However the effectiveness of
the input scheme has been over they have been marred by several setbacks that
have hindered their full implementation. Some of these challenges include too
much government control, corruption, lack of funding, politicisation, lack of
skills among communal farmers, persistent droughts and floods and crop diseases
among others. These have severely weakened the effectiveness of the
agricultural input scheme to communal farmers in Zimbabwe.
Agricultural input schemes have been a common
feature that have been used by the Zimbabwean government to assist communal
farmers especially in the event of disasters and droughts. During these periods
the government would distribute inputs like fertilisers and seeds for free or
reduced costs to communal farmers. In Zimbabwe,
the
Ministry of Agriculture is largely responsible for the administration of the
Government Input Support Schemes since 2000 with its Economics and Marketing Department
being responsible for the planning and procurement. The inputs are distributed
through relevant parastatals such as the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Tobacco
Industry Marketing Board (TIMB), Agricultural and Rural Development Authority
(ARDA), Pig Industry Board (PIB), District Development Fund (DDF), and National
Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). Muchara (2009)
These
institutions are also involved in the identification of beneficiaries and
recovery of the loans. Initially the private sector used to distribute inputs
to the farmers on behalf of the government (e.g. Reapers for groundnuts and
COTTCO for cotton). The Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
provided funds for the procurement of the inputs. The private sector was
encouraged to get involved in the provision of inputs to farmers through
contract farming. Over the years the number of institutions involved in the
government input schemes was reduced and companies from the private sector
ceased to distribute inputs on behalf of the Government. Muchara (2009)
The practice of input schemes dates back to the
colonial era where colonial governments rendered agricultural
resource support to farmers though this
was less of direct input support and more of input price subsidies, viable
product prices and general institutional support to relevant private and public
enterprises. Chatizwa (1997). Intensification of the agricultural input scheme
intensified from the year 2000 after the implementation of the FTLRP. From this
period Govere etal (2009) highlights that there has been a deliberate
government effort to support farmers through direct provision of inputs,
necessitated by the need to prop up the new farmers created by the FTLRP. The FTLRP
created a massive vacuum in agriculture production following the forced
eviction of commercial white farmers. The
programme thus resulted in massive land transfers from the large-scale
commercial farmers to the smallholder farmers under Model A1 (small-scale
resettlement) and Model A2 (medium to large-scale resettlement) schemes. Govere
(2009).
In
the immediate aftermath of the FTLRP the Zimbabwean government in its quest to
boost agricultural production and restore it to the glory years introduced the
Crop and Livestock Credit Input Scheme to assist the new farmers in meeting
production levels sufficient to enhance national food security and food self-sufficiency.
The input scheme was put in place with the key objective of assisting communal
farmers to establish themselves and to recover from the devastating effects of
unfavourable economic and natural Environments like droughts and floods.
Mushunje (2005). However, the input scheme
proved to be not successful as it lacked adequate funding and government
support to see it through. The government was already operating on a budget
deficit thus the coming in of the input scheme put so much strain on government
coffers. As a result very few communal farmers managed to benefit from the
input scheme and those who managed to benefit were so few that they had no
impact to the overall agriculture production and development. The limited
government resources also resulted in failure to meet input demand while the
inherent leakages in the distribution system have fuelled the black market thus
exacerbating the plight of the smallholder farmers. The delays in input
provision affected the production levels of most farmers, even those who are
well endowed, because of the apparently widespread dependency syndrome among
farmers. GoZ (2006).
In
addition, the 2005/2006 summer season saw the launch of Operation Food
Security/Maguta/Inala input scheme programme. The programs objective was to
ensure food security by mainly focusing on production of maize, wheat and small
grains. The input scheme was not that effective since it streamlined the
targeting of crops and it resulted in a narrower-range of crop inputs being
distributed. Only a few communal farmers managed to benefit from the input
scheme since gave top priority to those farmers that were close to water
sources or had access to an irrigation scheme. During that year another input
scheme known as the Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement facility
(ASPEF) was introduced by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) following the
announcement of the May 2005 Post- Elections and Drought Mitigating Monetary
Policy Framework to provide capital finance for agriculture and related
activities at concessionary rates. This was in recognition of the critical role
played by agriculture in the Zimbabwean economy, with the sector then
contributing about a fifth of the country’s Gross Domestic Product.
ASPEF
aimed at establishing linkages between agriculture and other key sectors of the
economy that are critical in enhancing economic growth and to enhance food
security, boost foreign currency generation through exports and foreign
currency savings through import substitution on food and related products (RBZ,
2006).however, this input scheme for the communal farmer was not effective as
it mostly targeted A2 farmers who had been lefty behind in previous input
scheme. However as compared to the previous input schemes this was better
funded thus communal farmers missed out on a valuable input scheme. This same
scenario resonated in the implementation of the The Winter Crops Inputs Loan
Scheme which mainly encompassed wheat production, had limited scope targeting
only those farmers with capacity to irrigate although the implementation
modalities were the same with the summer programmes.
Moreover,
as earlier highlighted agricultural input scheme in Zimbabwe is not only done
by the government alone. NGO’s and private companies are actively involved in
the input scheme system. Over the years development aid agencies have been
playing a significant role in the provision of agricultural inputs and support
services in Zimbabwe and other developing countries. On the NGO side the main
aim of agricultural input scheme relief and recovery programmes is to ensure food
security and self- sufficiency of vulnerable households and to strengthen their
capacity to handle future disasters. According to Rohrbach et al. (2004), several
reasons have been commonly cited to justify the need for embarking on
agricultural input assistance in Zimbabwe. These reasons are key indicators of
showing how effectiveness the agricultural input scheme has been to communal
farmers in Zimbabwe. Some of these reasons include poor rainfall leading to
widespread shortfalls in food production relative to household and community
needs, Shortages of basic foodstuffs on the retail market, increasing the
probability that farmers will consume some of their seed supplies, The sharp
decline in economic growth, reducing remittance income and off-farm employment,
Shortages and consequent high prices of agricultural inputs on the retail
market, The high incidence of HIV/AIDS resulting in labour shortages, capital
losses and a larger proportion of child headed households.
Against
this background it can therefore be said that the agricultural input scheme in Zimbabwe
has been effective in addressing short term goals. For example a number of
donor agencies have assisted farmers to recover from seasons of natural
disasters and many communal farmers have benefited from new technologies.
However, generally the input scheme has created donor dependency whether it is
conducted by the government or NGO’s. Donor dependency has created more
problems as people have become over reliant on the government for support every
farming season. The government itself has done little to capacitate or empower
communal farmers to be self-sufficient. Resultantly the agricultural input
scheme has not been effective since year in year out there is continuous repetition
of the same thing without any progress. Therefore in light of this input
distribution is gradually being replaced by more market-friendly relief
distribution approaches such as input credit schemes, vouchers redeemable at
rural retail shops or voucher-based seed fairs.
Furthermore,
it can be said that the input scheme in Zimbabwe has not been effective for
communal farmers because The implementation of the government input support
programmes has been occurring in an environment characterized by declining
macro-economic fundamentals and has thus faced many challenges. Some the challenges
that have emanated include hyperinflation and shortages of foreign currency
resulted in acute input shortages. For instance, the fertilizer industry
operated at between 30 and 60% of capacity during most of 2006. These shortages
of essential inputs like fertilizer, chemicals and fuel have impacted
negatively on agricultural production during the post-2000 period, thus,
slowing down the recovery of the agricultural sector. Rusike (2006)
In
the same vein of argument in factoring the costs of production, input suppliers
were compelled to use the overvalued official exchange rate for the
determination of the input prices yet some of the foreign currency would have
been obtained at parallel market rates. The controlled prices in an environment
characterized by hyperinflation and foreign currency shortages resulted in
severe input shortages which expectedly gave birth to a thriving parallel
market for most of the agricultural inputs thus defeating the purpose of
assisting the vulnerable new farmers who were sometimes crowded-out by powerful
individuals who took advantage of the inherent loopholes in the distribution
system. This happened in this way because the government input programme took
advantage of the geographical spread of GMB depots to distribute inputs (Govere
et al. 475) whose prices were pegged at the same price throughout the country.
Consequently, this reduced the marketing margins that could have obtained by
private firms had the traditional marketing systems been allowed to prevail.
The
unavailability of heifers on the market and shortage of foreign currency to
import breeding stock severely constrained the livestock component of the input
programme. Furthermore, government price controls affected the supply of most
of the critical agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and fuel. These
controls reduced the profitability of private sector involvement in the supply
of inputs especially at a time when they had to source most of their foreign
currency requirements at parallel market rates. Inadequate fuel supplies
hampered the distribution of inputs to farmers and there were major delays that
seriously affected crop production input schemes was never planted due to the
low levels of mechanization in the smallholder sector. For instance, the
2002/2003 season saw the sale of 45,000 tonnes of maize but some of it was not planted
(Matondi and Munyuki-Hungwe, 2006).
The
issue of lack of land tenure security has hampered the access of commercial
loans by new communal farmers. The Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and
Resettlement has started the process of issuing 99-year leases for the A2
farmers who were allocated land. However, there are still major concerns on
whether the 99-year leases offer sufficient tenure security to be used as
collateral against commercial loans. There were some dishonest farmers and
non-farmers who exaggerated their financial requirements and successfully
acquired government assistance but later diverted the money to other
investments such as the money market (RBZ, 2006). Some non-deserving farmers
with own resources also applied for inputs and funds, thus crowding-out other
farmers who genuinely needed assistance.
In
light of the central role that was played by the government in funding input
supply, it should be noted that the combination of controlled input prices and
credit funds availed at concessionary rates resulted in farmers enjoying an
implicit subsidy at a huge cost to the economy, especially considering the
macroeconomic destabilization effect of the budget deficit. Furthermore, some
of the inputs were not used at all (Matondi and Munyuki-Hungwe, 2006) or
unproductively used while some funds were diverted to non-agricultural uses
(RBZ, 2006). Widespread evidence in the press over the years indicates massive
leakages from the government input support programmes. Some of the inputs were
disposed off on the parallel market where they fetched higher prices while
other inputs were directed to non-agricultural activities, particularly fuel
which would have been distributed to farmers at highly subsidized prices by
NOCZIM thus severely compromising the effectiveness of the input scheme to
communal farmers.
Moreover,
the severely limited transport and administrative capacity of the GMB has
resulted in serious delays in the distribution of inputs to farmers despite the
existence of a wide network of GMB depots throughout the country. Most
commercial transporters are reluctant to service remote rural areas because
there are insufficient incentives to ply the off-tarred routes. The
administration of the Government Input Scheme has been so capacity demanding
that GMB has been stretched to the extent of diverting from its core business
of crop marketing and relief food distribution. Some farmers have voiced their
concerns about their perceived “dumping” of inputs by GMB, which is usually
unaccompanied by important information such as the prices of the inputs and
crop management instructions. (Matondi and Munyuki-Hungwe, 2006)
One
of the major policy shortfalls of the Government Input Scheme has been the
failure by the relevant government ministries to clearly distinguish between
commercial agricultural input credit schemes and the free relief handouts. This
has confounded the targeting of beneficiaries under each of the input schemes
with some well-endowed farmers also receiving inputs under the free scheme.
This poor targeting has created two major problems. Firstly, most recipients under the government
input schemes do not feel obliged to repay the input or cash loans. They assume
that government support is always a benevolent act meant to bring its citizens
out of poverty. This has worsened the burden on the fescues. Secondly, it has
also created a deep-rooted dependency syndrome among Zimbabwean farmers. The
concomitant problem is that when government distribution is late in the season,
even the well-off farmers are also affected because they have become so used to
receiving and not buying agricultural inputs.
In
conclusion it can be said that the Government Input Support Programme was
essentially a response to the needs of the new farmers under the FTLRP
including the communal and old re-settlement farmers. While the objective of
the programme has primarily focused on ensuring household food security, the
2006/2007 season has witnessed a renewed focus on building national strategic
grain reserves. The government input support schemes have immensely benefited
the smallholder farmers who would otherwise have languished in a vicious trap
of low improved input utilization and poor agricultural productivity. These
input programmes have ensured agricultural recovery of farmers operating under
periods of harsh economic and natural environments. However, a number of things
went wrong. The massive government involvement as an input price controller,
purchaser of inputs and input distributor created a conflict of interests due
to the direct competition with the private sector in the provision of inputs.
In
addition, the government failed to separate the commercial agricultural input
credit schemes from the agricultural free handout scheme which led to
significant leakages at a huge cost to the economy. The private sector is also
to blame for the failed input distribution policies during the FTLRP period.
The private sector failed to respond adequately to the input demands of the new
farmers, not only because of the unfavourable economic climate, government
controls and the high costs and risks of serving the new smallholder farmers,
but also due to lack of innovation to meet the new challenges. Finally, if the
government has to supply agricultural inputs to farmers, the use of alternative
input distribution approaches such as vouchers and seed fairs which involve the
private sector, offers an opportunity to effectively and efficiently distribute
inputs to farmers without necessarily undermining or disrupting private inputs
markets
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