Zimbabwe’s print media coverage of the country’s military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998-2002: The case of The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Financial Gazette and The Zimbabwe Independent.

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents. i

Acknowlegments. ii

Abstract iii

Abbriviations. iv

    Introduction……………………..………………………………………………………1

Zimbabwe's military intervention in Mozambique……………………………………..…6

Justification. 9

Literature Review.. 2

Research Methodology.............................................................................................. 17

Chapter 1 Background to the Congo Crisis...................................................................... 19

                SADC's Intervention in the DRC……………………………………………...25

Chapter 2 Reasons for Zimbabwe's Intervention in the DRC……………..……………..27

                    Kabila’s legitimacy…………………………………………………………33

                        Personalisation of the war……………………………………………….….37

                        Timing of the war………………………………………………………...…45

Chapter 3 Impact of the DRC war on Zimbabwe………………….…………..…….......64

                    Economic Impact ……………………………………………………….….65

                        Casualty figures: Human Cost of the war…………………..……………....77

                    State media's reportage on casualties………………...…………………..…67

                    Private media's reportage on casualties…………………………………….74

                    Withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from the DRC………………………...79

                     LessonsLearnt……………………..……………………………………….80

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………....…….……81

Bibliography……………………………....…………………………..…………………83

ACKNOWLEGMENTS

I would like to thank the following people who helped me in this paper, Mr and Mrs. Gudza for their support, my friend Bernard Timowa for telling me to believe in myself, Mr Tapfumaneyi, Mr Hungwe and Mr Ncube for their assistance. I am indebted to my supervisors Dr Chingono and Mr Zimudzi who dedicated his time to my work. I salute Mr and Mrs Kuutsi and not forgetting Robina for their important inputs into this work, God Bless them. I extend my gratitude to Takalani the lovely lady who helped me in digitalising cartoons in this paper and Mr Tafadzwa Kandemiri for helping me edit my work. I also thank The Guests (Michael Kudakwashe and Victor Mavedzenge) for indirectly financing this paper.

Lastly I dedicate this paper to my uncle Mr Kuutsi, Bernard Timowa, Amina, Amanda, McDonald Gudza and my parents.

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on Zimbabwe’s print media coverage of Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war. It takes a comparative approach to the coverage of Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC by The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Zimbabwe Independent and The Financial Gazette. This dissertation analyses the media’s versions of the DRC war. It deals with various themes such as reasons for Zimbabwean military intervention, expenditure in the war and effects of the war on Zimbabwe. The above-mentioned media houses tended to exaggerate the magnitude of certain events. In some cases they gave piecemeal reports on certain issues. The study does not analyse every story that was written concerning the DRC, but it concentrated on selected material. The study also proves that the private and state media were equally guilty of selective and superficial reportage and bias. The paper sums up by making recommendations on the relations that should prevail between the government and the media.

ABBRIVIATIONS

AFDL      -              Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

BBC        -              British Broadcasting Corporation

CDM      -              Congolese Democratic Movement

DRC        -              Democratic Republic of Congo

ESAP      -              Economic Structural Adjustment Programme

EU       -  European Union

FAZ        -              Zairian Armed Forces

IMF        -              International Monetary Fund

ISDC       -              Interstate Defence and Security meeting Committee

MDC      -              Movement for Democratic Change

RCD        -              Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie

SADC     -              Southern African Development Community

UN         -              United Nation

UPDF     Ugandan People Defence Forces

US          -              United States

USA       -              United States of America

WB         -              World Bank

ZDF        -              Zimbabwe Defence Forces

ZNA       -              Zimbabwe National Army

ZTV        -              Zimbabwe Television

                                                        INTRODUCTION

This paper looks at the Zimbabwe’s print media’s coverage of Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC. It discusses crucial themes that were aired by the private media namely The Zimbabwe Independent and The Financial Gazette and on the other hand the state media or mainstream media The Sunday Mail and The Herald. The research gives an analysis of the above-mentioned media houses’ interpretations of certain issues for example the reasons for deployment of Zimbabwean troops into the DRC, casualties and expenditure and the economic effects of the war on Zimbabwe.

The term private media refers to non–state owed media houses. The private media is also known as the independent media or free media. The government does not financially support private media houses. Examples of the private media include The Financial Gazette, The Independent and The Daily Mirror. On the other hand, the public media is state owed and is funded by the state, for example The Herald and The Sunday Mail.

Understanding the role of the media in war reportage is important. The media plays a crucial role in agenda setting, which is the ability to determine which matters stand out in the public discourse.[1] It is in this context the media spotlighted the DRC conflict. However one has to question the sort of information that was given to the public and to what extent was that information objective. However being biased is not synonymous with being inaccurate since one can still be accurate but still be unfair. Bias is basically lacking fairness and balance in one’s reportage.

The media plays an important role in disinforming, misinforming and informing the public in both peace and wartime. Disinforming the public is deliberately withholding information thus supplying only little information or no information at all. For example the state sponsored media was not adequately publishing the casualty figures or battles in which SADC allies would have been defeated. Misinformation is the act of misleading the public or the enemy by giving information, which is false on a particular subject. Misinforming can be used as a strategy to mislead the enemy by deliberately and secretively supplying wrong information in a bid to make the enemy panic or relax under the false impression that the opponent is weak. For example prior Zimbabwe’s intervention the government denied that it was going to give military aid to the DRC. According to Mahachi, Zimbabwe was only going to help DRC in military training of its army and logistics only.[2] Informing the public is adequately giving the recipients relevant and essential information that enables them to make informed choices and decisions. The media played these roles during the DRC war by supplying information to Zimbabwe.

It is important to note that while the media plays a watchdog role for the public by spotlighting issues, the public also dictates what is written in the newspapers. The public may ask questions to their governments while the newsmen provide the channel through which the questions are heard. The public can also shape what newspapers write through staging demonstrations hence directing the newspaper to certain issues.

The media is a physical medium or channel through which messages are transmitted from sender to receiver. In general, print media, is defined in this paper as a medium that disseminates printed media matter. Print media includes hard copies of newspapers unlike electronic media, which is centred on soft copies.

When dealing with newspapers as historical sources one has to take into account that there are many factors that influence the content of newspapers. The basic one is the issue of ownership. The owners of the press influence the news content. In the case of the DRC war it is evident that The Herald and The Sunday Mail, which were state owned extensively supported Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC. These papers trumpeted the successes of the state and gave blurred accounts on Zimbabwean losses in the war. Ownership has an impact on the editorial policy of the newspaper. The editorial policy determines how and what the journalist ought to write. Feltoe pointed out that the editors in the official media have tried to practise self- censorship due to fear of being censured or sacked.[3]This shows that the owners of the media determine the journalist’s content and certain penalties may be used to force journalists to comply with company policy.

Journalists can be an impediment to objective reporting due to their own biases. Lack of objective reportage can be seen by the journalists’ diction or choice of words. Scribes can use words with loaded meanings to describe certain events. For example in the case of the DRC war, the private media frequently described Kabila as an ‘illegitimate’ and ‘unpopular’ leader. On the other hand the state media referred to Rwanda and Uganda as foreign invaders implying that the DRC war was not an internal conflict as some private media argued. Diction can show a critical reader the perceptions of the journalists. Deadlines may influence journalists to write incomplete and half-baked stories. According to Goodwin the facts, which journalists can produce sometimes, add up to the truth, but journalists are seldom able to put sufficient facts together at a given time to be able to tell the truth about some subject.[4] A deadline makes it difficult for journalists to conduct as much research as possible on certain issues.

The government may use censorship mechanism to silence the press. Government officials may merely refuse to comment on certain issues. According to Feltoe “There is no law in Zimbabwe which obliges public officials to supply information when requested to do so by the press or to reply to questions put to them by the press.”[5] The secretive nature of government officials makes it difficult for journalists to get intimate knowledge on matters concerning the war. In addition the Official Secrets Act passed in 1970 has severe punishments and penalties for anyone who would have divulged state secrets.[6] On the flip side the Legislation protects the government disclosure of information. Section 4 of the Zimbabwean Official Secrets Act criminalises the unauthorised disclosure by a state employee or government contractor of any information that he/she has learnt in the course of employment or whilst carrying out the contract.[7] However the media responds to these legislations by interviewing military men or informants who are not happy with the system then hiding their informants by using such terms as ‘reliable sources’, ‘military sources’ or ‘inside sources’. While it is noble to hide informants there is also a danger of journalists quoting ghost sources just legitimise false information.

In some cases physical harm, threats and intimidations of reporters are some of the apparatus used to gag the press, during wartime. Journalists maybe incarcerated or killed by the authorities or belligerences for example Tony Geraghty was arrested by the British government for contravening The Official Secrets Act after publishing that security forces and the intelligence were using sophisticated surveillance systems in the Irish war.[8] Coming back home two Daily Mirror journalists were arrested for carrying a story on a foiled coup attempt at KG 6 barracks.

However governments generally defend their positions by stating that state secret should be observed by all means necessary. It should be of note that world over freedom of expression is not an unlimited right. According to Kikwete “True Freedom is not without limits” and “Limitless freedom is anarchy”[9]Limitations may be imposed on such grounds of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the State, public health and the protection of the reputations and lives of persons.[10]Feltoe on this issue argues that non –access to information concerning public administration results in a non-accountable public administration.[11]Therefore it is necessary for Government to supply information concerning state welfare.

Newspaper articles that are written during war are emotional, so were some articles that were written on the DRC. However the advantage on studying a war that has long passed is that emotions would have subsided. In measuring how these articles were telling the truth a conscious effort has been made to compare with works written after the war as a yardstick to measure or test for objectivity. This study relies on external sources such as interviews and reports by some International Organisations. This study also uses retrospective judgment to search for truth by using other sources surrounding the DRC conflict. Post war articles have a different tone of the conflict hence they can be reliable to some extent. However post war articles are not hundred percent correct.

Zimbabwe’s military intervention in Mozambique.

Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC was shrouded with far more controversy than had been its involvement in Mozambique in the early 1990s.The reasons for this was that during the Mozambican campaign the reasons for intervention were crystal clear and the media had no problems in reporting the war. According to Hungwe, Zimbabwe did not scrunch on flimsy justifications for its involvement as it did on the DRC intervention. According to him the relationship between Zimbabwe and Mozambique had long history, Zimbabwe’s independence had come as a result of Mozambican aid. [12] Gutsa echoed the same sentiments when he highlighted that Mozambique had lost its citizens while giving aid to Zanla and Zipra forces during the liberation struggle therefore Zimbabwe felt indebted to aid Mozambique when Renamo attacked it.[13] It seemed that during the Mozambican intervention, the public were kept in touch with what was happening. Gutsa observed that during the intervention in Mozambique, ‘Matsanga’ became the talk of the day, old people in the rural areas would warn their grand children to be aware of the rebels who were conducting cross-border raids.[14] 

Tapfumaneyi pointed out that Zimbabwe’s interests were being threatened by the rebel’s contravention of the shortest and cheapest route to the sea.[15]This explains why Zimbabwean troops were deployed to protect the Beira railway line under Operation Grapefruit, Tete under Operation Cobwell and the pipeline. These areas were of strategic importance to Zimbabwe’s economic lifeline and trading.

It should be noted that DRC is not an immediate neighbour of Zimbabwe like Mozambique; this led the private media to question the rationale of intervening in a distant country several thousand kilometres away. It is also a fact that Zimbabwe does not share a border with the DRC. The government had to explain its interests given that there seemed to be no shared history of relations between Zimbabwe and the Congo. The independent media was aware that war meant loss of lives and economic expenses; it was from this understanding that it wanted the state to sufficiently justify the losses it was making in the DRC.

This dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 looks at the background of the Congo war. This chapter goes further to explore the contradictions inherent in the Congo’s history. Both the private and public media used the contradictions in the Congo’s history to legitimise their views on Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC. It is imperative to note that the controversy that surrounded the intervention whether Zimbabwe should be involved in the DRC conflict or not came from the different interpretation that was given to Congo history by these two media houses.

Chapter 2 analyses the reasons for the Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC. It points out crucial points of diversions between the public media and private media in issues such as Kabila’s legitimacy, timing of the war and why Zimbabwe had intervened in the war. The private media argued that the DRC war was a Mugabe’s crusade and it had nothing to do with preserving the independence of DRC from ‘foreign invaders’[16]. On the other hand the public media argued that it was a SADC led intervention to restore legitimacy.

Chapter 3 brings to attention the dynamics and impact of the war on Zimbabwe as the press reported. The chapter interrogates the economic effects, human cost of the war and the withdrawal of Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) from the DRC. The private media argued that Zimbabwean losses in the war were causing indiscipline and sporadic reporting for duty. On the other hand the state media argued that heavy rebel casualties were militating against their fighting. This chapter explains why the public and the private media gave contradictory versions to the same events. Lastly the chapter looks at the different perceptions that were aired by both the private and public media on the reasons of withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces from the DRC. The chapter also makes recommendations on future relations between the military government and the media.

Justification

This research was motivated by a genuine need to understand the positions of the Zimbabwe’s print media on such an imperative issue. There is a need to understand how the media responded to Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC. It is a fact that when a nation is at war it would either directly or indirectly affect society and simultaneously impact on the media reportage.

Understanding media’s coverage of war equips strategists with information that is vital in planning and the actual fighting. Neglecting the media has serious consequences such as demoralising the forces and the home-front. Failing to take into account the power of the press is suicidal since the press has the power to shape public opinion.

Many scholars have overlooked the Zimbabwean print media’s coverage of the Second Congo war and there is a chronic dearth of information in this area.[17] Some scholars like Brigadier Tapfumaneyi, Retired Colonel Rupiya and Baregu, made use of newspapers but they did not interrogate the sources used by the newspapers and the manner in which the press covered certain aspects of the war. This dissertation seeks to give an analysis of how the state media and private media covered the DRC war. This research interrogated The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Financial Gazette and The Zimbabwe Independent because these papers were the most vocal newspapers on the DRC war. These papers carried extensive reportage on the war.

Literature Review

This section is divided into four categories. Firstly this paper reviews works that look at media in general for example works by Tomasell. Secondly the study will review works that looked at the media’s coverage of certain issues for example works by Kitzinger, Wadhal, Khan, Ncube and Chinyanganya. Thirdly the paper will review works that looked at the DRC conflict drawing out crucial themes concerning the war for example works of Campbell, Rupiya, Tapfumaneyi and Baregu among others. Lastly the paper will review works that are similar to this study for examples works by Scholtz. 

Muller and The Tomasells highlight why and why not journalists report certain information. The authors of the article argue that selection of news is ascribed to the filtration process called ‘gate keeping’ which is done in the newsroom. The writers argue that journalists are forced to conform to company policy, which determine what and how issues should be reported. According to Tomasells and Muller, the penalty of defying company policies and the dominant discourse leads to dismissal, victimization and even body harm[18]. This article is essential in explaining why the state journalists did not castigate Zimbabwean intervention in the DRC and why the private media did not glorify or trumpet the successes of the government. The simple explanation at this juncture is that both private and public journalists were complying with their editorial policies.

Kitzinger’s article looks at media coverage of sexual violence against women and children. The scholar notes that news reportage on sexual violence is inadequately covered. The scholar points out that the media glosses over issues by doing marathon coverage of events. Marathon coverage was explained as a lack of in-depth analysis of issues.[19]The media was also accused of focusing on controversial issues only thus Kitzinger alludes to how the media is concerned with newsworthy sellable material. When one takes a close look at the DRC war it can be observed that most of the stories that were reported by the media focused on controversial issues such as casualty figures and budget expenditure. The media in some cases gave marathon coverage for example the private media would hastily give numbers of Zimbabwean casualties without explaining in detail what had happened or reporting casualty figures of the rebel. On the other side the state media displayed pronounced partisanship in its reportage by only trumpeting SADC’s successes.

Waldahl’s book focused on the media coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election analysing the contents of News @ eight the main news program from ZBC, as well as political material in the following papers, The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Daily News, The Financial Gazette and The Standard among others. Waldahl assessed how the papers described and commented on important issues and the information they gave concerning the preparation for elections. He observed that these papers gave one- sided coverage of the 2000 election. Zimpapers were accused of being pro-government while the independent media were pro–opposition. Waldahl argued that the pro-government press blamed political violence on MDC while the pro-opposition blamed it on Zanu PF.[20] Similarly, in the case of the DRC, the state media and the private media gave one-sided accounts. The Herald and The Sunday Mail portrayed Rwanda and Uganda violating human rights and unleashing terror attacks on the civilian population while The Zimbabwe Independent and The Financial Gazette reported on Zimbabwe’s losses, strategic blunders and indiscipline.

Chinyanganya’s thesis makes comparison of The Herald and The Daily News’s reportage on farm occupations in Zimbabwe.[21] The scholar’s analysis was centred mainly on the diction that was used by both dailies concerning the occupations. His paper cited that the Daily News referred to the farm occupations as invasions and war veterans were portrayed as invaders on the contrary The Herald referred war veterans as comrades and the invasions as farm occupations. This study does is important in this study’s analyses of diction. It is important to note that diction is vital in detecting bias or objectivity.

Ncube’s dissertation looked at The Sunday Mail’s coverage of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Somalia. He focused on why the media house relied much on the foreign media.[22] His research gives fundamental insights on why The Sunday Mail failed to independently cover the peacekeeping mission. Ncube cited that lack of financial resources made it impractical for the paper to visit Somalia so as to get first hand information on the proceedings of the war. However the reliance on the foreign media was also present in the DRC conflict. The private and public media relied to some extent on foreign media such as Reuters or AFP among others.

Khan’s article explains why journalists were giving biased reports on the Sierra Leone civil war. He cites harsh government restrictions on press freedom and certain journalists’ personal preferences as some of the factors that influenced content.[23] Khan does not take into account that journalists do not report independently from their companies but they are forced to subscribe to certain guidelines or editorial policies set by the media firms they work for. The editorial policies act as ‘gate-keepers’ and their role is to filter information. According to Tomasell, journalists’ reportage is pressured by company policies and bureaucratic nature of news organisations.[24] His study was looking at frontline journalists who were situated where the conflict was while this study analyses a media, which was reporting issues that were located geographically far away from Zimbabwe.

Wamba’s article and RCD’s provides this research with reasons why the rebels were fighting against Kabila. RCD’s article argues that Kabila’s governing methods had forced them to take arms. [25] Wamba’s article gives reasons why there were divisions within the rebel camp. His article can be used to confirm whether the squabbles that were reported by the state media were an artificial construct or not. These articles give us the rebels’ version of the truth hence they are important to this study.

Baregu and Pumungwe treat the interests of SADC allies as being homogenous. Baregu treats the DRC war as an ‘imperialist war’ aimed at achieving power and wealth. He argues that the alliance between Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad was a formidable challenge to South Africa hegemonic designs.[26]Pumungwe’s article argues that the war was against a foreign invasion. [27]. It is important to treat Zimbabwe as an independent actor in the DRC war driven into the war by its own interests. Machiavelli remarked that actions of states are driven by motives. According to the International Relations Dictionary, national interests are the fundamental objective and ultimate determinant that guards the decision of policy makers of the state in making foreign policy.”[28]It should be noted that the welfare and security of the state overrides friendship or regional obligations therefore Zimbabwe should be viewed in the same light.

Ngoma’s article grapples with the positions taken by SADC members in the DRC. He categorises selected SADC members into ‘Hawks’, ‘Doves’ and ‘Penguins’.[29]He defines hawks as actors that tend to be aggressive and who supports military solutions while doves would favour a more peaceful approach. Penguins are actors that may not opt for any particular position as such, but instead skirt around the problems while seeming to solve them.[30]The scholar observed that some commentators suggested that the decision to send military forces was designed to personally benefit some actors including Zimbabwe. Ngoma correctly points out that Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC was characterised by widespread and hostile media coverage, and negative international media blitz as well as academic commentaries that presented SADC allies as the worst ‘proud’ and ‘greedy’. This article’s preoccupation was not about media reportage of the war however it does look at important themes such as Zimbabwe’s motivations for intervention in the war as well as the implications it had, which this study will focus on.

Rupiya’s article tried to show the motivations that lured Zimbabwe into DRC. He argued that problems at home forced Zimbabwe to intervene in the DRC hoping to divert economic problems at home. He observed that the initial economic problems were caused by the failure of Socialist policies that the government had adopted and subsequent implementation of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, which economically ransacked the already troubled economy. Another biting issue was the unbudgeted compensation of War Veterans. The public attention had to be diverted elsewhere in order to cool the rising temperatures at home that were characterised by food riots and industrial action. However some scholars like Shivji dismissed this assertion as being shallow.[31] Rupiya goes on to argue that Zimbabwe was motivated by a need to open new markets that were an alternative to the closed South African markets. He cited that South Africa had closed many of its companies to Zimbabwean investors. His article comes handy in explaining some of the reasons why Zimbabwe entered into the DRC however there is a need to question how the media tackled Zimbabwe’s intervention and what impressions it tried to create on the readers.

Tapfumaneyi’s article tried to justify the legality of Zimbabwe’s military intervention. He outlined three major reasons for Zimbabwean intervention namely: (a) Zimbabwe’s role as the chair of the SADC Organ of Politics, forced it to lead by example, (b) as a matter of principle which entailed Zimbabwe’s mandate of giving aid to other sovereign states, especially SADC members against foreign invaders, and lastly (c) as dedicated member of SADC.[32]He touches on why the media was not adequately informed about the war his explanation was that secrecy was needed to starve the rebels of valuable information that might warn them. His article makes reference to The Zimbabwe Mirror of 16 April 1999 that had carried a report on South Africa’s supply of weapons to the DRC.[33] However he does not carry a content analysis on the media sources he outlined. This research will dwell on analysing the press reportage on DRC war.

Scholtz’s article focuses on contradictions that are inherent in war reportage by using the Falklands war, the Vietnam War and Operation Boleas as examples where the military clashed with the media. He stated that during the Falklands war Argentineans got most of their intelligence from the BBC, due to the reckless reportage of some journalists. He observed that During Operation Boleas the South African government failed to justify its intervention in Lesotho.[34] He argues that by starving the media of valuable information concerning the war these governments and their militaries plagued relations with the media. However, Scholtz treats the media as unified entity, he ignored that the media exists as either state media or private media. This study divides the media into two thus the public and the private media and then it compares how their reportage on the DRC war differed.

Research Methodology

Weekly papers sometimes do not give immediate information on certain events as daily papers do. Weekly papers have to compress the weekly events into a single volume. This study focused on three weeklies and only a single daily, which, is The Herald. This dissertation analyses certain stories, commentaries and analysis of the mediums in question. The research is based on a thematic approach in its analysis for example it outlines certain controversial themes such as “Kabila’s legitimacy, Timing of the war, Casualty figures and Expenditure”. For verification purposes external sources such as oral interviews, secondary sources and the Internet are used in this paper. This research analyses these themes by using content analysis thus interrogating what the journalist wrote. Content analysis also deals with the journalist’s diction and sources of information.

This paper also uses retrospect judgement, which means analysing the DRC war against some documents and comments made after the war. The advantage is that the emotional revelations would have subsided to a certain level. The government and the media may open up on certain issues.

In conclusion the research aims at interrogating media’s reportage on the DRC war. Understanding how the media reports during conflicts is important especially to strategists. It helps them make informed decisions when dealing with the media.

                                Chapter 1: Background to the Congo Crisis

This section tries to give an objective account on the DRC war by relying, mainly on secondary sources. The paper traces how the DRC war came to be. The background allows us to understand the positions, which the media took. Both the private and the state media draw their arguments from a close analysis of this background. For example the private would argue that Kabila was illegitimate basing on this background, while the state would give a completely different interpretation to the same background. This background is necessary in providing the reader with an understanding of how the press interpreted these events. Various questions arose from Congo’s history. This history forms the bedrock of Kabila’s legitimacy.

The DRC has always been a trouble spot in the Great Lakes region. DRC is the third largest country in Africa and is one of the richest countries. However, to date it has never experienced sustainable peace. Foreign players have manipulated ethnic divisions within the state to enrich themselves and on the flip side various ethnic groups have also manipulated foreign players to get political mileage.[35] The abundance of resources within the country such as diamonds, tantalite (cobalt), niobium, uranium, and petroleum has attracted foreign states as well as individuals to participate directly or indirectly in the war. Indirectly meaning the use of local rebel militias to carve mining areas in return for political control. Directly meaning that foreign states would fight openly in the battlefield, as was the case of Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola.

Many players showed interest in Coltan ore. It is widely used in the aerospace and electronic industries for capacitors and system transmitters after being refined to tantalum. According to K Harmon the United States (US), which is still one of the foreign players in the DRC war depends entirely on importation of this mineral.[36] It is in this context that the US’ involvement in the DRC was to get cheap raw materials such as Coltan ore and other resources mentioned above. Research by International Peace Information Service, an independent Belgian institute, showed that European companies trading in Coltan ore were contributing to the financing of the war in DRC. Some of the companies that were outlined were Cogem and Sogem of Belgium, Masingiro of Germany, Chemie Pharmacie Holland of the Netherlands and the Swiss offshore company Finmining.[37] Coltan ore is an essential element in the production of mobile phones and computers. Mobile phone companies such as Nokia, Siemens and Alcatel were using tantalum from DRC.[38]

In strategic terms given the abundance of resources in the DRC it would have been naïve to discredit Zimbabwe’s intervention as a misguided foreign policy. What should be of note is that the government of Zimbabwe failed to convince the public that it was lucrative to send troops to DRC by merely keeping silent about many issues. Although efforts to inform the people about the economic benefits of the DRC war were prominent in The Sunday Mail, the paper also gave multiple factors that had motivated Zimbabwe’s intervention hence blurring the supposed economic benefits.

The private media on the other hand did not dispute that DRC was a rich country and the war had no benefits but their argument was that a few top government officials would divide the spoils of war. Many high-ranking officials were implicated with looting and benefiting in the DRC on the expense of the nation. Individuals such as Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, Job Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Onesimo Moyo, Emmerson Munangagwa, and Moven Mahachi; the Chief of the Armed Forces were mentioned in private media’s reports as well as the UN report which accused Zimbabwe for plundering resources in the DRC.[39]  The free media called the DRC war a selfish war, which did not warrant the use of ZDF to protect private interests. There were claims that Mugabe wanted to gain prestige as well as wrestle regional leadership from Mandela.

This section shall deal with providing a brief history of the DRC war. DRC was once a Belgian colony but it never enjoyed the fruits of independence since the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) murdered the first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba in 1965, during the Cold war.[40] Mobutu came into power through the US ticket and his thirty two year old rule never benefited the nationals. According to a Financial Gazette comment “For over thirty two years, they endured unparallel suffering and humiliation and thousands died at the hands of Mobutu’s hit squads.”[41] Scholars generally agree that Mobutu was very corrupt and many countries were anxious to see him toppled. According to Rupiya, ‘Mobutu’s long 32 year reign had been so disgraceful that the world was at one [in] calling for his removal ‘by whatever means’.[42] Among these countries were Tanzania, Eritrea, Angola and Zimbabwe. An International Crisis Group’s report asserted that Zimbabwe and Angola were also active in Kabila’s ADFL, but they were not playing a leadership role.[43] However their role remained in technical and logistical support while Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi gave military assistance. 1996 saw The First Congo War, which was partly a result of cross border raids carried out by Hutu militias who had taken refuge in Congo after the Tutsi offensive in the 1994 Rwandan genocide[44]. Cilliers and Malan noted that 30 000 Hutus who fled into North and South Kivu were members of former Rwandan army (FAR) and Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu) militia, who had killed 800 000 Rwandan Tustis and moderate Hutus, rearmed in their refugee camps of eastern Congo, and were able to resume the war in 1996 carrying cross border raids.[45] The new Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda protested against this violation of their territorial integrity and began to give arms to the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge of eastern Zaire, and this did not go well with Mobutu. His government vigorously denounced Rwanda and Uganda’s supply of arms to the Banyamulenge. Suspicion between the belligerents worsened the relations. Rwanda and Uganda accused Mobutu of employing his Forces Armies Zaiiros (FAZ) to destabilise them[46]. It is from this background that Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi began to funnel money and weapons to a long-standing enemy of Mobutu, Kabila who headed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL).[47] In return for their support Kabila at a small town of Lemera near the shores of Lake Tanganyika, agreed that he would ensure the internal security of their countries especially in the border areas where the rebels that had enjoyed sanctuary during Mobutu’s rule.[48]On top of this concession there was an agreement that Lieutanant Colonel James Karehe was to become Chief of Staff and 2-3000 military experts to second him.[49] Scholars generally agree that Kabila’s allies wanted to place a puppet ruler who could easily be manipulated. According to Rupiya, Kabila was instructed to halt his advance after occupying a large portion of the Congolese territory; the idea was to install a weak leader in Kinshasa without the overall control of the DRC. The puppet leader would not interfere or be able to reverse the de facto balkanisation of the Congo.[50]The invasion gained its own momentum and Kabila’s allies could not stop the whole occupation of DRC.

However tension grew when Kabila fell out of favour with his former allies after the defeat of Mobutu. It became clear that Rwanda and Uganda wanted to undermine Kabila’s authority. Rupiya observed that Rwandan forces started to hunt down and eliminate the Interahamwe in Kivu and other Hutus elsewhere initially after Kabila came to power and this had an effect of upsetting the local entity in DRC. According to Kabila the rebellion was fuelled by Uganda and Rwanda’s attempt to control him and their favouritism of ethnic Tutsis[51]. According to A.W Tapfumaneyi

Once in power President Kabila had demonstrated a remarkable aversion to manipulation from any quarter, including Rwanda and Uganda who felt that they had earned that right by helping him into office.[52]

Contrary to the above view some scholars accused Kabila of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement of Congo. According to a Monograph article it was soon evident that he would not reverse corruption, mismanagement and self-enrichment that had characterised Mobutu’s government.[53] Bizima Karaha who was a former Foreign Minister of Kabila denied that DRC was under foreign siege, he stated, “Kabila has failed to govern …in his one year (rule) he has done more political damage than Mobutu ever did in thirty-two years.”[54]

F. Reynjens argues that contrary to the expectations of Kabila’s sponsors, the new regime installed in Kinshasa proved unwilling to solve two problems that of the security of eastern borders where the Hutu militia was launching attacks from. Wamba dia Wamba cited that Rwanda was basically in Congo to protect its sovereignty after the late ‘Hutu’ President Hybramana’s army (FAR) ran into Congo when he was deposed hence its invasion of Congo was triggered by a security concern.[55] In addition Kabila was accused of refusing to guarantee the citizenship of the Congolese Tutsi.[56] Kimaro a Tanzanian political refugee also argued that Tanzania would not give aid to Kabila because after he came into power he removed some Tutsi elements that were in the army.[57] There is unanimity among scholars on the underlining reasons for the DRC invasion.

SADC’s intervention in the DRC.

Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC on 2 August 1998 according to Tapfumaneyi under the guise of internal rebellion while Burundi joined later.[58] Kabila appealed for aid from the SADC since it had joined the organisation at the heads of State in Blantyre, Malawi in September 1997. The Victoria Falls summit of August 7-8 1998, the August 17-18 KG 6 Barracks extraordinary meeting of the Interstate Defence and Security meeting Committee (ISDC) legitimised SADC to intervene militarily in the DRC with the aim of repulsing Rwanda and Uganda from the DRC. It should be pointed out that these meetings were done behind closed doors and it’s highly probable that most Zimbabweans woke up to find Zimbabwe in the DRC war. This secretive nature of the government forced the media and the public to demand answers on why the country was at war. The private media asked why an arbitrary decision had been taken without consulting the people. There were many speculative explanations about why Zimbabwe was at war some papers citing that it was a personal war, some arguing on the morality of intervening on behalf of an illegitimate ruler.

Zimbabwe with Angola, Namibia and Chad gave their commitment to supply troops to the DRC. After the deployment of the troops many sectors of Zimbabwe’s media fraternity began to report on the war since it had become a topical issue due to the involvement of ZDF in the DRC. Many Zimbabweans became concerned in what was happening in Congo since their sons and daughters were fighting in the DRC. The media became the middleman for passing information from the DRC to the home front.

There are scholarly arguments that argue that the intervention was not SADC’s. Campbell points at the composition of the countries that supported Kabila. He argued that Zimbabwe’s claim to support DRC under SADC was diluted by the involvement of non-SADC members such as Sudan and Chad who offered their help although they were not bound by the organisation’s decisions.[59]

Chapter 2: reasons for zimbabwe’s intervention in  The Democratic republic of congo.

Kabila’s Legitimacy

This chapter analyses the extent to which the media was objective by judging it under the ethical principles of accuracy and fairness. According to Goodwin, accuracy is being truthful in both gathering and reporting of facts whilst fairness is an ethical standard, which entails not judging prematurely.[60] There is also a need to question the extent to which the journalists conducted their research in other words the extent the media knew the issues they were reporting on. Mahoso remarked that an ignorant journalist breeds an ignorant reader. [61]

The private media interrogated Zimbabwe’s reasons for intervention. It demanded to be told a convincing reason for Zimbabwe’s intervention. It wanted answers that would explain Zimbabwe’s involvement in protecting an illegitimate regime that came into power unconstitutionally. It was a fact that Kabila had seized power from Mobutu through the barrel of the gun not the ballot box. War had been an instrument of policy that Kabila had used to attain power, so the independent media questioned the rationale of protecting an unconstitutionally elected government using the taxpayer’s money.

From these unanswered questions the private media concluded that Mugabe initiated the war for his personal benefit. In augmenting this view it set an agenda that continuously and rhetorically questioned the origins of Kabila’s government. It argued that the public had a right to know. One editorial comment remarked, “Zimbabweans have a right to be accurately informed given the sacrifices they are expected to make”.[62] The private media felt that there was a need to be enlightened on the state of affairs. This situation was not unique to Zimbabwe alone given that, universally the media demands information from policy makers on certain issues. The US had been quizzed over its invasion of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. One of United States Army Chief of Public Affairs Major General John G. Meyer’s cited “The media are like alligators ….We don’t have to like them, but we do have to feed them.”[63] What the General alluded to was that the military should supply information to the media instead of allowing the media to hunt for information alone. In other words he meant feeding journalists with censored information. Giving the media the liberty to hunt for information would result in it unearthing stories that might compromise the war effort.

The question of legitimacy was the basis on which the private media centred on to justify that Zimbabwe’s intervention was ill founded. Colonel Ncube who was the SADC’s taskforce spokesman argued that the intervention was not on behalf of Kabila but on behalf of the DRC, which had been admitted into SADC.[64] The argument was supported by the fact that Kabila’s government had been accepted by SADC in September of 1997 at the Organisation’s Summit of Heads of State in Blantyre, Malawi.[65]This argument seems to collate with Rupiya’s comment that, “The accession to membership of the SADC organisation had serious implications for member states, a fact that appeared to have been conveniently overlooked at the time.”[66] Bangura also highlighted that Rwanda and Uganda had made the mistake of overlooking the membership of the DRC in SADC.[67] Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC under auspices of SADC hence fulfilling its duty as concerned member. According to G. Pumungwe, SADC intervened in accordance with an agreement made in 1995 at a meeting in Cape Town where SADC states gave commitment to take collective action against attempts to remove legitimate governments by military means.[68]

The private media deliberately ignored that DRC was a member of SADC which is an indication of bias, except for Sithole’s article entitled ‘ Laurent Kabila is a costly waste’, in which he argues that the admission of DRC into SADC was premature, ‘admission should have waited until a government with popular consent was established.[69] What is striking is that the debate on the admission of the DRC into SADC was never a topical issue until Zimbabwe’s intervention. Logically Sithole had to challenge the membership of DRC during the time SADC was accepting a government whose credentials were questionable. Challenging the admission of DRC just because Zimbabwe had committed its troops in the country was unfair. Sithole should have challenged the admission before Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC war. Another school of thought might argue that Sithole made a legitimate argument, he had a right to challenge the admission of the DRC into SADC at the time he did. It is worth to note that the DRC had been a distant issue, which had remotely affected Zimbabwe. It was then obvious that the Zimbabwe’s intervention would trigger an analysis of every aspect concerning the justification of Zimbabwe’s military involvement. Taking a close look at Sithole’s column entitled the ‘Public Eye’ most of his comments were on issues that concerned Zimbabwe. Because the DRC war had become a concern of Zimbabwe after the deployment, Sithole felt that all aspects had to be discussed.

Campbell also refutes the claim that it was a SADC led intervention by arguing that the so-called SADC forces had allied with some Francophone countries like Chad and Sudan that were not bound by SADC rules.[70] In strategic terms it is important to note that it will be naïve to turn down allies whether they belong to one’s organisation or not. Churchill once remarked, “There is one thing worse than fighting with allies –that is fighting without them”.[71] Co-operation with these nations showed some sort of Pan- Africanism. Such an alliance that is beyond regional alliances provides a platform where military knowledge is shared. The fact that Sudan and Chad participated does not dismiss that it was a SADC’s intervention.

Some private media’s editorials portrayed the war as an internal conflict thereby refusing to accept that Rwanda and Uganda had invaded the DRC. Sithole observed that the bulk of the forces that Zimbabwean troops were fighting against were Congolese nationals.[72] Campbell also treats the war as internal conflict triggered by Kabila’s irresponsible and arbitrary policies against namely the Banyarwandan peasants. Campbell highlighted that Kabila had mobilised the crudest violence against citizens in the East. Kabila had used the radio to incite violence against the Tutsis. He cited that the radio was calling the citizens to “take a machete, a spear, a hoe, a spade …to kill the Tutsi.”[73] CDM accused Kabila for mass killings, arbitrary violence, tribalism, nepotism and corruption.[74] Cilliers and Malan cited that Kabila failed to reverse the corruption and mismanagement and self-enrichment that had characterised governance in the Mobutu era and he clung to power through a combination of coercion, divide-and-rule tactics and foreign support. [75]The RCD complained that Kabila practiced “solitary exercise of power, nepotism, clientism, corruption, ethnic cleansing, violation of human rights, Kangaroo court type of justice, etc Kabila (is) the President, Minister of Defence, President of AFDL.”[76] Kabila’s rule had been outlined by RCD as the major cause of conflict. From the above quotes it is evident that many scholars believed that the Congolese people were fighting for freedom against a despot.

It would not be adequate to treat the war as an internal conflict; it is common knowledge that Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda had their troops in the DRC. A letter written by Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN admitted that Rwanda had some troops in Congo, primarily to secure its borders against 1994 ‘genocidiers, Interahamwe and the EX-FAR’.[77] According to A. Gasana “The RPA went into the DRC because the genocidal forces operating from the DRC’s territory threatened Rwanda’s vital security interests. [78] Rwanda did not dispute that its troops were in DRC but it challenged the UN’s allegations that the presence of its troops had been motivated by the desire to exploit that country’s resources.[79] In June 2000 the UN took Rwanda and Uganda to the International Court of Justice, an acknowledgment that DRC had been invaded. Historically the DRC had been a state, which had its affairs run by foreigner influence. Mobutu had come into power through the ticket of the USA, Kabila had come into power through the ticket of Rwanda and Uganda among other nations, and it was then unlikely that his overthrow was going to be purely an internal issue. The First Congo war had shown that there were many players who were interested in the DRC war. Some commentators had even called the First Congo war an African war. Another point that dismisses the internal war argument is that of the mineral wealth of DRC. According to Makonero DRC is coveted by neighbours and the western powers who want a share of the wealth.[80] The existence of foreign companies carrying mineral exploitation on behalf of their governments meant that in case of a conflict these nations would get involved hence the war would bloom beyond a mere internal conflict. It can be deduced that some private media’s reports, which, portrayed the conflict as merely an internal issue, were inadequate, biased and these reports lacked intimate knowledge of what was going on in the DRC. Some scholars with radical views like Pumungwe dismiss rebels as an artificial construct made by Rwanda and Uganda.[81]

Portrayal of Kabila

The private media portrayed Kabila in a negative way just to discredit him. This media was selective on what it reported about Kabila. It published stories in which Kabila was treated as an irresponsible and illegitimate leader. The independent media sided with rebels such as Wamba Dia Wamba. The state media on the other hand portrayed Kabila in a positive light.

The independent media portrayed Kabila as an unpopular leader. It should be pointed out that the private media had a legitimate claim basing on the fact that there was a section of the population who did not support Kabila such as the Banyamulenge and most of the citizens in the East. However the private media should have pointed out that Kabila was popular among the Mai Mai, Lendu and Congolese Hutus and those in the West of Congo. Morgan Tsvangirai who was the chairman of the National Constitution Assembly was quoted as saying that Mugabe was sacrificing lives and the economy to help a despot in a war, which was ‘stupid, unwinnable and unjustified.’[82]The RCD shared the same sentiments they argued that Zimbabwe had wrongfully sent its troops into the DRC in sheer ignorance of Kabila’s tendencies.[83]

Another article argued that Kabila was equivalent, to the rebels he condemned. The Zimbabwe Independent stated that Kabila had come to power via precisely the same insurrection he condemned. Hence he was illegitimate like the rebel leaders he opposed.[84]

Sithole added to the above statement by challenging Kabila’s legitimacy, he cited “We now refer to rebels fighting against the ‘legitimate’ government of president Kabila. How did he establish the government he pronounces legitimate?” [85]Numerous articles were written to delegitimise Kabila by focusing on his mismanagement and purported execution of the Tutsi. Sithole argued “The rebellion is about ‘delegitimising’ Kabila’s regime by the same method and by the same people that legitimised it”[86]. In other words Sithole was saying that war was a way by which the Congolese elected their leadership. On the flip side Sithole was urging Zimbabwe not to get involved in DRC’s internal affairs.

The Zimbabwe Independent started a propaganda campaign for Wamba Dia Wamba used to be the leader of RCD. A political analyst in the article “Rebel leader Wamba Dia Wamba talks” praised and glorified the personality of Wamba. The article used the term “smooth talking rebel leader”.[87]The private media’s tactic of portraying Kabila’s opponents in a more positive light was a way to discredit Kabila. The article informs the reader about Wamba’s academic qualifications. The journalist wrote ‘but Wamba is no swaggering soldier of fortune. He is a Harvard University educated professor of History.’[88] The private media was suggesting to the readers that Wamba educational credentials would not allow him to conduct a senseless rebellion unless he was driven by genuine reasons. Wamba accused Kabila of reproducing Mobutu’s authoritarianism and nepotism, relying on people from his family and clan.[89] According to Masiwa, Wamba was subscribing to the principles of democracy.[90] Sithole argued that, “The man (Kabila) is a fake of a revolutionary. Moreover, he looks like Pepe Kale!”[91]It should be noted that Sithole equated Kabila’s looks to those of a musician. His idea was to show that Kabila was not fit to rule Congo in all aspects.

Hungwe in an interview confessed that his reportage as The Zimbabwe Independent reporter was biased towards Wamba due to his dislike of what he termed a corrupt leader, however he has changed his perception of Wamba who he had glorified; he now views him as another opportunist who wanted to politically benefit from the war[92]. It is clear that the rebel’s side was full of opportunists. It should be of noted that the rebels were not united although they had a common enemy for example CDM was supported by Uganda and RCD was supported by Rwanda. The explanation that can be given to account for this scenario is that internal rebel movements sought to capitalise on Rwanda and Uganda’s invasion of the Congo. One question that needs an answer is why is it that the rebels were not uniting against Kabila if their movement was for the benefit of the Congolese citizens as they claimed. On top of this there is overwhelming evidence of divisions among rebel armies. However these shall be discussed in the following chapters.[93]

The Sunday Mail and The Herald deliberately ignored the issue of Kabila’s legitimacy. The papers concentrated on the invasion of the DRC by foreign powers. They emphasised that the invaders were not SADC members. According to the State’s mouthpiece, the intervention was serving, as a deterrent to would-be-aggressors.[94] On the issue of legitimacy Tapfumaneyi argues that it was not fair to question Kabila’s legitimacy since he had come as a liberator that had redeemed the DRC from Mobutu’s kleptocracy.[95] Mandaza also reiterated the same point he cited that there was a need to assess its case on its merit and not equate the process that had brought Kabila to power with those that sought to replace him. [96]Given the nature of Mobutu’s rule, which according to Leith was characterised by “co-option, harassment, imprisonment, exile and assassination” of the opposition[97], Kabila could not have wrestled power through elections. There was no other way Kabila could have came into power except through military means. According to Tapfumaneyi, Kabila should be judged through the standards of the time when he came into power, he argued that it was too early for the DRC to hold elections since it was coming from the First Congo war.[98] He added that Kabila had a program that was interrupted by the rebel’s invasion that would have seen him holding elections after two years.[99]The Herald in an article entitled ‘Why SADC allied forces, in the DRC’ highlighted that President Kabila was pursuing a democratisation programme, designed to culminate in general elections, therefore allowing the Congolese people an opportunity to elect their own leaders without fear and coercion.[100] Tapfumaneyi argued that Kabila had inheritated a rotten system, torn apart by thirty-two years of Mobutu kleptocracy and dictatorship.[101] This argument generally accepts Kabila presidency on the basis that he had intentions to hold elections. This paper argues that Zimbabwe had operated under the yoke of colonialism for ninety years but it managed to hold elections in a year after the Lancaster House Conference nevertheless the First Congo war took only two years and Kabila failed to hold elections. Kabila in this regard should have done better. It might be a possibility that Kabila deliberately delayed to hold elections in a bid to stay in power and was lucky to use the invasion of the DRC by Uganda and Rwanda as an expedient to lure SADC to help him stay in power. Under the pretext of his program being supposedly interrupted, he was able to lure other nations to give him military assistance.

Personalisation of the war by the Private media

Personalisation of the war means that it was individualised, its conduct and outcome were modelled towards the gains of a single person and not the nation. According to K. Manungo, “the intervention was viewed as a selfish move by the political leadership and army brass, who were personally benefiting from the troops’ intervention.”[102] The private media personalised the war by using diction or choice of words that reinforced their claims that the intervention was for personal aggrandisement. The war viewed as “Mugabe’s personal crusade”.[103] Diction became a media weapon, which was used to drive this point home. According to W.G Pippert, “the words that journalists use are important perhaps as important as their stories.”[104]The private media used suggestive and pejorative headings like “Mugabe’s DRC comes under fire” and “DRC Jungle becomes Mugabe’s waterloo”[105]The war was henceforth individualised, it became a “Mugabe’s military intervention” and “Mugabe’s decision” to go to war not a national issue. Some scholars like M. Rupiya argued that the deployment was based on Mugabe’s personal initiative[106]. It was also argued that Mugabe should withdraw from the DRC.[107]According to Chinaka “… if any Zimbabweans die in the Congo a fitly epitaph would be ‘They died so that Mugabe’s ego would flourish’.[108]

In supporting the point that the DRC campaign was for Mugabe’s benefit the private media highlighted that Zimbabwe faced no immediate security threats from Rwanda and Uganda hence there was no need for Zimbabwe to get involved. The Financial Gazette, J. Lovell argued that Zimbabwe had no immediate concerns in the DRC hence the campaign was a Mugabe’s crusade.[109] Another example is that of Sithole’s article entitled “Mr President; Why are we in the DRC?” which argues, “We are only waiting for an impending defeat because we are fighting an immoral war for private interest”.[110] The UN reported that the government sent troops to the DRC to rally support, which was waning.[111]

The private media pointed out that the DRC war was a Mugabe’s policy to gain prestige. Chinaka argued that there was no political or material debt that the DRC owed Zimbabwe hence Mugabe was using this campaign to increase his prestige. The argument was also supported by the fact that Zimbabwe was going through economic mayhems hence there was a need to divert the people’s attention from problems at home. The private media felt that Mugabe was losing his popularity because of mounting domestic problems. The only way he could get support was through a foreign war, which would subsequently divert the attention of the people from troubles at home. Chinaka cited, “Things are bad at home and …he is seeking glory abroad.”[112] Shivji dismissed the argument by stating that involvement in the Congo was not the best way of deflecting attention for the single reason that intervention was not, and was never likely to be popular with the people of Zimbabwe.[113] However this paper will test whether there were any economic and problems, which Mugabe wanted to shield people’s attention from.

In evaluating the above claims this paper shall use the economic statistics of the period in question. Economic problems indeed were a reality that even the state media admitted. The dollar depreciated from $12 against the greenback in June 1998 to $38.5 in February of 1999.[114] It was also evident that the growth of the economy from 1990 to 1997 had been a disappointing 1.5% and the economic debt rose from zero in 1980 to over 93 billion in November 1998.[115]Another problem Mugabe had to wrestle with was the compensation of war veterans. He had to make war veterans grants using decrees. This shows that there were a considerable number of parliamentarians who were against the idea of grants. Mazarire and Rupiya assert that grants made by Presidential decree defied all arguments that had been advanced by his colleagues, especially the ministers responsible for labour and social welfare.[116]Over Z$4.5 billion was paid as gratuities to 52 000 claimants.[117]As a result the local dollar fell by 71.5 percent against the greenback while the stock market crashed by 46 percent as investors rushed for the US dollar.[118] It can be argued that the Mugabe’s giving in to war veterans’ demands against a parliament which opposed the payment is a reflection that he did not want to risk losing a subsequent number of supporters. The use of the Presidential decree was a reflection of a hostile environment that was looming.

The Herald and The Sunday Mail’s reportage argued that the war was a SADC intervention not Mugabe’s personal crusade and it was a popular intervention supported by the majority of Zimbabweans. According to an article published by The Herald, which was responding to some of the private media’s articles, “The intervention is being done under the rules of the Sub-Committee on Defence and security. This was considered by the meeting attended by SADC members, six at the level of defence ministers and then the high commissioner.”[119]The state media argued that Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC as a concerned member of SADC. The public media was at pains to push the point that all protocols had been observed in the deployment process of the allied forces. Reference were made to the Victoria Falls and Luanda meetings where the decision to intervene in the DRC were taken. [120] An editorial representing the views of The Herald highlighted that the intervention was done under the rules of Southern African Development Community. This type of reportage was to correct what the private media had regarded as a breach of SADC protocol regarding intervention. An editorial reflecting the views of The Zimbabwe Independent had stated, “He (Mugabe) had not waited for the report of the regional team of foreign ministers to stabilise conditions”.[121]The argument was that Zimbabwe had not followed the proper channels of deployment of troops as stated by the SADC constitution. J Calliers argued that the intervention had not been authorized by the two-third quorum as stated by the SADC treaty.[122] The argument being that there were only four countries present instead of eight members that should constitute a quorum.[123] Tapfumaneyi disputed these claims by arguing that there were twelve states present.[124] Ncube also argued that there were twelve member states present including South Africa, which was represented by its High Commissioner. [125]Contrary to this view Bangura argued that South Africa was not represented in 14 SADC countries’ meeting.[126] However what is important on this aspect is not the presence of states at the meeting but the number of the states that endorsed the intervention. It should be noted that the loopholes within the structures of SADC has in many cases led to conflicts arguments whether intervention is authorized or not. Calliers argued that Zimbabwe took advantage as chairman of the OPDS to warrant intervention, a situation similar to what South Africa had done in its intervention into Lesotho intervention under Operation Boleas through using its chairmanship position in SADC.[127]

Mushayakarara had argued that Mugabe had not wait for the regional team’s report.[128] RCD also accused Zimbabwe for hastily deploying its troops before the report.[129] Mushayakarara deliberately omitted information on the Uganda and Rwandan blitzkrieg that meant a rapid invasion of the DRC. The chain of events, which characterised DRC’s invasion, confirms the great speed at which Rwanda and Uganda were moving. On the 2^nd of August the rebels captured Muanda, the Banana naval base, Kitona, The seaport of Matadi, the Inga dam hydro-electrical power plant in Bas Congo. By the 7^th August the rebels had seized the electricity supply of Kinshasa.[130]Against such a background there was also a need for rapid response. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia evoked the SADC’s article 4 on Defence Protocol, which stated that an attack against one should be considered an attack against all. In order to implement this agreement a Joint Committee under article 11 was established.

The Herald used diction that showed that the operation was legitimate .It used the following terms in most articles: ‘President Kabila’, to show that Kabila was the legitimate head of state. ‘SADC taskforce’, was used to argue that all protocols of SADC had been followed hence it was an authorised intervention. ‘SADC allies’ and ‘SADC intervention’ might have been used to show that the intervention was not a sole responsibility of Zimbabwe in other words it was not a Zimbabwean intervention but a SADC intervention. When referring to Uganda and Rwanda terms like ‘invading troops’ were used to show that these states had invaded the DRC. In an article entitled “Rebel leader Ondelane injured as allied forces bombard enemy targets”, the term rebel was used five times.[131] This term was deliberately used to cement the view that DRC was under foreign attack. On the other hand it was legitimising SADC’s intervention.

The state media used church interviewees as a tactic to popularise its intervention. Matarire highlighted that the church had commented that the presence of SADC allied forces was necessary to prevent further genocide being inflicted on innocent people by the rebels who were being supported by Rwanda and Uganda.[132] Mahoso’s article entitled “Church can play role in the DRC conflict” argued that most criticism on SADC’s intervention had been based on ignorance and the church had revised its position hence there was also a need for the private media to do the same. To cement the rebels’ brutality the state media used parish interviewees as a way to show that SADC was playing a positive role in the DRC unlike the rebels.

The state media argued that Zimbabweans were supporting the intervention. According to Zindi most Zimbabweans from all walks of life expressed their support for the county’s joint military intervention.[133]What should be noted that the words ‘most Zimbabweans’ stood for a small elite group of politicians, business leaders and political commentators. Among the interviewed were Philip Chiyangwa a businessman, Cde Nhlanhla the President of Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce and Cde Shambambeva the Highfield Member of Parliament. The journalists did not cover the opinion of laymen although he claimed to have covered the opinion of majority. A question, which can be posed, is how could Zimbabweans support an intervention, which they did not understand whereas the government was not transparent with information. The claim that all Zimbabweans supported the DRC might be void of reason when one takes into account that the public is not a mere passive recipient of information.[134] Mahoso acknowledged that most Zimbabweans were ignorant of the reasons for intervention.[135] This issue will be discussed in the next chapter.[136]

 Timing of the war

Sun Tzu one of the greatest military thinkers highlighted “he who wishes to fight must first count the cost”[137]The government was criticised for failing to correctly time its intervention. According to Hungwe the government had not budgeted for the war and it was the same mistake it had done when it compensated the war veterans.[138] Tobaiwa reiterated the same point, he highlighted that the intervention was an unbudgeted activity and it was going to put pressure on the fiscus finances[139]. The private media wanted enlightenment on why Zimbabwe would declare war when it was going through economic hardships. The private glaringly reported on the economic implications of the war. On the contrary the state media superficially touched economic aspects of the war while optimistically covering their success in the war.

Some of the state media journalists and columnists reflected that the government was sparingly giving information. Mahoso observed that the Government with its SADC allies could have done more to explain clearly legitimate reasons for the intervention and such explanation could have won the allies support from the very beginning of the war.[140] There was a need for government to explain the immediate deployment of Zimbabwean forces when the economy was performing badly. 

An article in The Zimbabwe Independent argued that Mugabe was holding talks with President Laurent Kabila in the city on the Congo war, thereby fuelling public anger that he was spending most of time attending to foreign issues instead of tackling deepening social and economic crises at home. [141]The private media pointed out that the government had not considered economic problems that were traumatising the nation. This meant the government was guilty of hastily deploying troops without doing a cost benefit analysis. According to the Machiavellian dictum state interests drive foreign policy; it is in this context that the private media wanted to be given explanations justifying the Zimbabwe’s intervention.

Another question the private media asked was why the government, which was surviving on donor funds, would risk a foreign war with taxpayer’s money. Nyoni pointed out that Zimbabwe which was looking for handouts and restitution from former colonial powers had no right to inject scarce financial resources into a war which was not its own.[142]

The private media portrayed the government as being spendthrift. The private media emphasised the economic side of the war and its implication on its relationship with donors. The Financial Gazette and The Zimbabwe Independent interviewed economists to reinforce the view that DRC was going to be an economic burden to Zimbabwe. One economist was quoted as saying that the country’s credibility as a borrowing country had been lost.[143]It should be noted that the private media’s speculation that the deployment of Zimbabwean troops in the DRC would result in conflicts with monetary organisations turned out to be valid. According to the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act passed by the US Congress in December 2001, Section 4a) 1

Through economic mismanagement, undemocratic practices and the deployment of troops to the Democratic of Congo, the government has rendered itself ineligible to participate in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (also known as The World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[144]

The state media could not deny that the nation was going through a hard time but at the same time it failed to tell the public who was going to fund the war. The financial position of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) can be used to justify that the economy was performing badly. The company’s debt in June was 59% in 1998 but February 1999 it had increased to 80%, while foreign debt increased to 1993 billion from 654 million.[145] Inflation rose from 29.8 percent to 50.0 percent.[146] These figures confirm that the country was going through economic hardships.

The Sunday Mail portrayed the reasons for intervention in a different light. It argued that the DRC war was an answer to Zimbabwe’s economic problems. The paper launched a propaganda campaign to market the economic opportunities that the DRC war would provide Zimbabwe with. In an article entitled ‘Business Chances versus possible risks in the DRC’, Gabi the secretary for the Zimbabwe - DRC friendship Association urged Zimbabweans to have interest in the DRC. He wrote “The DRC is a land of opportunities I challenge every Zimbabwean to have a personal interest in the DRC”[147] The writer gives an economic explanation to the intervention, he contrasted the DRC intervention with that of Mozambique by arguing that during the war in the latter, Zimbabwe was paying back for Samora Machel’s support however the former intervention was for economic interest.[148]The explanation on Mozambique was misleading since it was giving only a portion of truth. Many scholars are of the view that economic interests prompted Zimbabwe into Mozambique. Its priority in Mozambique was the protection of the railway line and the pipeline that were vital to Zimbabwe’s lifeline. This is also validated by the deployment of troops along the railway lines and the pipeline during the campaign.

The Sunday Mail pointed out that Zimbabwe had been motivated by the DRC’s natural resources. The paper pointed out the DRC had the third largest river that Zimbabweans could fish from and abundance of timber and rubber that would make tyres in Zimbabwe affordable.[149] Tapfumaneyi pointed that there was a need to harness and defend the waters of the Congo River as a potential solution to drought. There had been disputes in Southern Africa over water for example Zambia was uneasy about Zimbabwe’s plans to expand the Batoka South Bank Hydroelectric Project as well as Mozambique felt threatened about Zimbabwe’s Pungwe pipeline for Mutare.[150] In addition Rupiya observed that there were clashes even with South Africa. He stated that many South African companies had been closed to the advantage of South African economic interests hence there was a need of a new market that had minimal legal restrictions.[151] This proves that Zimbabwe had been motivated by economic opportunities in the DRC. Investors were assured that ZDF was going to protect their property, in addition investors were told not worry about the war because the war zone was 3000 km from Kinshasa. Gabi’s article in another sense was arguing that Zimbabwean intervention had been fruitful in creating peace in Kinshasa and everything was normal and business was on full swing. The ZNA magazine carried stories, which emphasised that SADC allies had managed to free Kinshasa. One article read “Business has never been so brisk in Kinshasa following the Allied forces success in defending the capital from the rebel onslaught”.[152] Tapfumaneyi observed that ZTV showed footage of ecstatic scenes of DRC citizens celebrating the liberation of Kinshasa by SADC Allies[153].

Gabi also argued that ZDF was in the DRC to protect Zimbabwean interests and it would do the same with investors interested in the DRC. However this contradicted with statements that had been reported in The Herald .The statement read, “The loss of payment for exports made on credit to the DRC would not be worth the deployment of a single soldier”[154]. The government was contradicting itself, on one end the government was in the DRC because of economic reasons and it would protect its investments and on the other it was stating that it would not deploy its troops to protect to secure some payments. According to Mahende the intervention was to protect the Inga Dam, which is of strategic importance to Southern Africa, and ZESA had made an agreement to import 55Megawatts.[155] Tapfumaneyi highlighted that Inga Dam which was only operating at 8% of its capacity was supplying power as far south as Cape Town and as far as Cairo, including Harare hence its recapture was of strategic importance to SADC allies particularly Zimbabwe which has a chronic shortage of electricity.[156] Columnists like Mahoso argued that the spread of destabilisation meant the prospect of an ungovernable region stretching from Khartoum to Northern Namibia and this would mean Zimbabwe would not be able to get cheap electricity.[157] Tapfumaneyi observed that Zimbabwe had contributed transport aircraft, advisors and substantial materiel and logistical assistance to the AFDL’s advance to Kinshasa during the ousting of Mobutu. Zimbabwe went to cultivate very close economic, political, diplomatic and military ties with the DRC. Brigadier Gumbo was already in the DRC to lay the groundwork for integration and training of DRC’s army.[158] This information seemed to be classified; Zimbabwe’s intervention in the First Congo war to oust Mobutu remained in the ears of a few privileged classes. The media might have been ignorant of Zimbabwe’s participation in the First Congo war this possibly is another reason why the private media argued that there were no historical relations between Zimbabwe and the DRC. 

Economic consideration especially valuable minerals in the DRC might have driven the intervention. According to an Oxfam report the deployment was concentrated in mineral rich areas. The organisation observed that Zimbabwean troops were deployed in Kasais and Katanga; areas were rich in diamonds, copper, cobalt and timber. Rwandan troops were concentrated in the Kivus and Maniema, rich in coltan, gold, timber and diamonds. Ugandan troops were in Ituri and northern Kivu, near areas that were awash in gold, timber, diamonds, and Coltan.[159] The Global Witness observed that Zimbabwe's involvement in the conflict in war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was allowing it to exploit that country's resources and keep Robert Mugabe's government afloat.[160] The location were ZDF were fighting from confirms that economic interests had been a driving force behind the intervention.

Another pointer was the involvement of private and government owned companies in the DRC. According to a UN report a private Zimbabwean company, Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG), whose shareholders were Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, Job Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, Onesimo Moyo, President of Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Isaiah Ruzengwe, General Manager of Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, got into a partnership with COMIEX; COSLEG was born of this partnership.[161] These reports cement the view that Zimbabwe was motivated by the desire to accumulate wealth from the DRC. The same report claimed that Billy Rautenbach’s money from Gecamines a private company had paid bonuses to the Zimbabwean soldiers. The above reports confirm that the intervention was not only driven by the need to restore sovereignty but by economic considerations.

There were rumours that Kabila owed Zimbabwe a lot of money. It was believed that Zimbabwe began to panic when the rebels tried to topple Kabila. The only prospect of Zimbabwe to recover the debt was to keep Kabila in power. According to Masiwa DRC owed Zimbabwe US93 million for war materiel that had been supplied during the First Congo war.[162]The New African magazine also pointed out that Zimbabwe intervention was triggered by a need to recover its debt. .[163] However the government refused to acknowledge this point by arguing that recovering a debt was not worth a single death of a Zimbabwe soldier. [164]Machiavellian politics dismisses the government’s naivety on this aspect. The government should protect its interests more than anything and by all means necessary.

The state media on the other hand argued that the deployment of troops in the DRC was at an ample time to avert bloodshed in the DRC. According to Maruma “All the allies did was to prevent a blood bath and to give diplomacy and negotiations a chance.”[165]The government’s mainstream media portrayed gruesome and horrific pictures of massacres carried out by the rebels on civilians as a way to justify its intervention to restore order in the DRC. The Sunday Mail carried a story in which an unnamed organisation and a Catholic Church leader revealed that they had witnessed civilians being locked in unventilated houses to suffocate to death, some were being injected with Human Immuno Virus (HIV) and in addition HIV positive men where being brought into the DRC and being forced on Congolese women by the rebels. However the article does not tell the reader where the men were coming from. In another shocking story the Rwandan government was accused of committing genocide then killing the recruits so as to eliminate the witnesses to the mass graves.[166] The state media was arguing that the SADC role in the DRC was to create stability and avert genocide.

The secretive nature on which the deployment was carried out caused the private media to be suspicious of the of the Government’s designs. Colonel Ncube commenting on the secretive nature highlighted that there was a need to withhold information so that the rebels would not know the clear intentions of SADC forces. Rupiya asserts that due to secretive nature of the government Zimbabwe was able to surprise the enemy. He wrote “Not only were the rebels caught napping with speed, resolve and commitment …”[167] It is important to note that the articles that were written on the actual day of deployment, which is 19 August 1998, did not cover the reasons for intervention but they focused on the divisions between SADC members especially on deployment of troops. SADC was divided between two camps one holding South African’s notion that there was no need to intervene militarily while the other supporting Zimbabwe, which was advocating for military involvement. Comrade Tsimba who was the (Member of Parliament for Marondera West) said hiding information form the people was a futile exercise because it would give rise to rumour mongering, half-truths, lies and speculation.[168]

This chapter has argued that the private and public media were divided on their reportage of the reasons for intervention. There was a lot of information that the media was not aware of. It seems that the private media was not aware of Zimbabwe’s participation in The First Congo war and secret agreements that were made after the war. Some independent reports hinted to some unpaid ZDI bills. The government was not forthcoming with information on why Zimbabwe had committed itself military in the Congo. The public media on the other hand argued that Zimbabwe was in the DRC because it was performing a SADC duty to prevent the DRC from falling into hands of foreigners. The Sunday Mail, which argued that the DRC war was the answer to the ailing economy, gave another dimension to reasons for intervention. However this reason seemed to be seconding the SADC duty. UN and Global Witness reports revealed that the DRC’s minerals had motivated Zimbabwe. Both the private and public media debated on the timing of the war, the private media argued that the intervention was ill-timed because Zimbabwe was in economic hardships hence the war was not well prepared for or budgeted for. The state media maintained that the intervention was to restore law and order.

The analysis in this paper has argued that the private media arguments on the illegitimacy of Kabila were shallow in that it did not take into account the circumstances that led Kabila into power. On the issue of timing of the war the paper argued that the Rwandan blitzkrieg demanded a quick response from SADC allies. This study also observed that Zimbabwe was motivated by numerous reasons. The private media privileged motives that differed from those of the state media. The state media argued that the intervention was on behalf of SADC; on the contrary The Sunday Mail argued that economic considerations were the driving force behind the war. The private media cited that private economic interests had informed the intervention.

Chapter 3: Impact of the DRC war on Zimbabwe

This chapter will analyse the impact of Zimbabwe’s military intervention in the light of media reports. The chapter looks at the economic impact of the war as well as the media’s treatment of casualties. Lastly it looks at how the media covered the withdrawal of ZDF from the DRC and then it gives lessons that were learnt from the war.

Economic impact of Zimbabwean intervention

FIG 1: Adapted from The Zimbabwe Independent, October 9, 1998, p.6.

FIG 2: Adapted From The Zimbabwe Independent, May 28,1999,p.12.

The private media used cartoons to portray how the intervention was causing economic problems. In Fig 1, Mugabe was depictated as putting out a fire that was engulfing his neighbour’s house. The interpretation to this cartoon is as follows. The neighbour who is being referred to is the DRC. The ‘fire’, which is being smothered by ‘Mugabe’, is the DRC war. The ‘fire’ that is burning the Zimbabwean house symbolises economic and social hardships such as starvation. ‘Mugabe’ is illustrated using his own ‘hosepipe’, ‘water’, ‘water tap’ and his ‘strength’ to put out the neighbour’s fire. All these things represent Zimbabwe’s economy, manpower, and resources invested to put an end to the DRC war. The cartoonist alludes to the wasteful nature of the government in terms of human lives. What should be noted is that the neighbour who Mugabe is supposed to be helping is not on the scene, and is contributing absolutely nothing to extinguish the fire. This scenario might have been alluding to the ineffectiveness of Kabila’s FAC, which some private media reports castigated for being useless in terms of fighting. The Zimbabwe Independent reported “FAC does not have the operational capacity to make any useful contribution to the war….”[169] Calliers and Malan observed that even FAC’s elite troops were unreliable in the battlefield.[170]

In the cartoon there is a newspaper, which reads ‘Business donate $500 000 for DRC, Allied troops.’ The illustration was used to portray the inconsiderate policies, which the government was practising. While money was being spent on DRC, Zimbabweans in Matebeleland South were starving and some were eating ‘tree roots’ and children were leaving school as a result of failing to pay their fees. It can be deduced that the government was endangering human security because of the ill-conceived foreign policy. The agenda, which was set in this illustration, was that Zimbabwe should pull out from the DRC and attend to its problems. This cartoon had some grain of truth within it; according to the UN’s report Billy Rautenbach’s money from Gecamines had paid bonuses to the Zimbabwean soldiers who were in the DRC.[171]Basing on this report there was evidence of some business people who had donated money to ZDF; hence the cartoonist was sarcastically portraying what had happened.

In Fig 2, Kabila was depicted drinking from a container written ‘Zim’s limited resources’ while under his physically huge body, there were crying children who were skinny, bonny and frail. Kabila’s illustration represents DRC as shown by the tag written on his shirt. His physically huge body represents the rich resources DRC as a nation has ironically the country is depicted as using Zimbabwe’s limited resources. Kabila is illustrated as being selfish and greedy. The camouflage Kabila is wearing and the grenade hanging on his side are probably made by Zimbabwe. According to the International Crisis Group, Zimbabwe had made arrangements to provide arms and uniforms to FAC.[172] The Zimbabwe Independent argued that Kabila was usurping Zimbabwe’s resources while its ministries such as employment; housing, health and education were suffering. The skinny, barefooted children referred to as street kids in the illustration are dressed in tatters while Kabila is well dressed in his military uniform. The words ‘Deprived Street kids’ might refer to the Government’s abandonment of its own ministries in support of the DRC. ‘Health’ is depicted as being worse than the rest. It is clear that ‘Health’ can no longer walk and is probably suffering from malnutrition. This is reflective of the poor healthy delivery that was in Zimbabwe during the era. Dzirutwe’s article in The Sunday Mail confirmed that the Ministry of Health and Child welfare had been hit by lack of financial resources due to inadequate national budget allocations.[173]The cartoon reinforces the independent press’ view that the war was not benefiting the nation in anyway. Hungwe in an interview questioned why Zimbabwe, which was going through turbulent time amid economic deterioration, would declare war using its limited resources, which would have been invested, elsewhere productive.[174] It can be deduced that Zimbabwe was suffering as a result of its intervention whilst the DRC was benefiting. According to Manungo “What can not be denied is that the intervention used up huge amounts of resources that could have been used at home”.[175] This cartoon to some extent was objective in illustrating the economic impact of the war.

The private media portrayed a picture of mass opposition to the Zimbabwe’s intervention. On the flip side the state media gave a picture of public consent to the war. An article entitled “DRC talks overshadowed by riots” highlighted that there was public anger over the rising cost of living as a result of Zimbabwe’s controversial military involvement in the DRC. According to this article the protests was as result of a 67% fuel increment[176]. The journalist used the term ‘public anger’ to show that the protest was advocated by the masses. Some foreign media houses viewed the demonstration as being triggered by Zimbabwe’s intervention. The New African magazine stated that people were holding banners which read, “Mugabe you are helping Kabila in his own war, now we have started our war with you”[177]. According to Gutsa who participated in the Chitungwiza riot, the demonstration was not against the DRC as such but it was a reaction to the bus fare prices that had tremendously risen, however the DRC war was used as an example to show that the government was usurping the country’s resources.[178] The Amnesty Annual’s report of 1998 gave a series of demonstrations that had been carried throughout that year but it did not refer to any particular demonstrations against the DRC war. The report stated that in January there were demonstrations and riots over food price rises, on the other hand civic society groups carried demonstrations advocating for constitutional reform. In March trade unions organised a nationwide strike against high taxation and price increments.[179] It should be noted that while there was no particular demonstration directly towards the intervention, the DRC war was used to justify that the constitution had to be reformed so that the President would not enjoy the power he had such as deploying troops without consulting the parliament

The Sunday Mail carried a story, which noted that a constitutional reform protest that the National Constitutional Assembly wanted to turn into a DRC anti-campaign had foiled due to the unwavering support the campaign was enjoying from the masses.[180] The state media was arguing that the war was popular; contrary to what the private media wanted the readers to believe.

The analysis of this paper argues that the DRC war was not popular internally or externally as the public media tried to portray. Ncube highlighted that, Zimbabwe would have received much support if only it had a website to counter the US and British opionated reports over the intervention.[181] This is an indication that the war was not popular abroad. There were even divisions within ZANU PF over the intervention. There were a section of people who opposed intervention like General Mujuru. According to Nyoni, when the DRC issue was risen in the supreme politburo, General Mujuru openly expressed his reservations.[182] There were some soldiers who opposed the intervention as well. Hungwe observed that there were reports of soldiers who ran away from being deployed in the DRC.[183] Another pointer that shows that the DRC campaign was unpopular is the extent to which the state media attacked and treated the private media. Some editorials castigated the private media by portraying it as an anti-government and unpatriotic. One editorial read, “The proliferation of the independent press is unhealthy for a small a nation like Zimbabwe.” [184]Others accused journalists for acting like misguided missiles. [185]Mahoso accused The Financial Gazette and other independent papers for failing to carry out research on what was causing the economy to decline. Mahoso observed that during the 1980s The Financial Gazette had extensively reported on the depreciation of the dollar but had failed to give the readers the reasons why the economy had gone down. He argued that the paper had hastily concluded that the war was the main cause of the economic slump without conducting any research.[186] The government isolated the private media and treated it with suspicion such that the private media was not taken on escorted visits to the DRC.[187] Such harsh treatment shows the extent to which the private media’s opposition to the war was taken serious.

The Zimbabwe Independent and The Financial Gazette repeated and amplified the budget and expenditure of the war. Their major concern was who was funding the ‘illegitimate war’. According to M. Sithole, “If it was on the authority of SADC, then national interests should make us ask why SADC is not funding the bill for the war.”[188]Since the two papers had viewed Kabila as an illegitimate they argued that Zimbabwe had no mandate to fund or finance the war effort. The onus was on SADC and the DRC. In supporting this stance, deteriorating conditions at home such as food riots and rising prices were blamed on the intervention as already mentioned. The papers tried to portray graphic details of money, which was being used in the DRC campaign. Peta highlighted that the Zimbabwe’s war machinery was gobbling lots of money because of the long supply lines that ZDF was using that were covering up to 2000 kilometres.[189] Peta observed that some fighter hawk planes were operating from Angola.[190] This information was accurate basing on the official information that can be captured in Zimbabwe National Army magazines. One magazine reported that the Allied Forces were depending mainly on aerial logistical supplies over long distance of up to 3500 kilometres while Rwanda and Uganda troops were enjoying logistical and territorial advantages.[191]

In addition The Zimbabwe Independent highlighted that ammunition, food, compensation of war victims and servicing of machinery, were other costs, which were being incurred by the government. The Zimbabwe Independent highlighted that ZDI was supplying US200 million worth of equipment to DRC.[192] Reinforcements were used as indications that Zimbabwe was getting bogged down with defeat in the Congo. The argument was why would one reinforce his troops when one was scoring victories. It was understood that Zimbabwe was spending 30 million dollars per day to sustain the war.  

The private media accused the government for lacking accountability and transparency over the cost of the war. B. Ncube in an interview highlighted that the military budget was and still is a sensitive issue that the government is not at liberty to unveil since this information would forearm the enemy. Colonel Ncube cited that Zimbabwe was not a unique case in concealing its war expenses given that nationwide governments deliberately withhold information for state preservation and security. [193]

This research observed that the government’s expenditure during the DRC war was extremely high. This paper relied on the budgets presented by the Ministry of Finance to test whether the private media’s reports were accurate. The budget estimate for Defence in 1998 was $5.540.187.000 (note this amount was budgeted for the following year).[194]However the actual amount, which was used, was in 1999 was $5,540,247,000.[195]In 2000 the amount was estimated at $13,292,479,000 for 2001 but what was used was $16,207,579,000.[196] The Financial Gazette reported that army used more than 12 percent of the total revenue for 2001, the paper quoted figures that had been presented to the IMF by the finance minister. The Government was reported to have spent $16.208 billion instead of 13.3 billion that was budgeted for by the finance minister. [197]This military over expenditure shows that the war was gobbling a lot of money hence straining the budget.

The government gave conflicting accounts on who was funding the war. Different Government Ministers made contradictory statements to the press relating to who was funding the military action. According to B. Hungwe the reason why the government would give contradicting accounts is that someone who was corrupt was benefiting. [198] The Minister of Defence, Mahachi had reported that Zimbabwe was covering some of the expenses. He stated “I know our economy is not doing well but this will not stop us of course, we are meeting some expenses and other allies’ forces are doing so”[199] Mahachi’s statement sounded as if the allies were jointily funding the war. The letter that the Minister of Finance Simba Makoni wrote to IMF in July 1999 contradicted with Mahachi’s statement, it gave the impression that Zimbabwe was funding the war directly from its budget. The letter stated that Zimbabwe was funding the war and it had cost the country US1.3 million per month or 0.4 per cent of the Gross National Product[200]. Contrary to these statements Kabila proclaimed “We pay the bills, we buy all the materiel from planes, we pay the troops …salaries in hard currency, for transport …so these people do not have to take from their budget”[201]. The International Crisis Group findings confirmed Kabila’s statement. The organisation observed that on September 4,1998 Kabila and Mugabe signed a deal for the ‘self-financing’ of the intervention. The agreement stated that Zimbabwe would provide arms and munitions to the DRC. In return Zimbabwe’s mining company Ridgepointe, would take over the management of Gecamines. It was also agreed that the government would receive 37,5 percent shares of the DRC government’s 62,5 percent of the firm’s profit.[202] The UN’s report gave another explanation that contradicted with Kabila’s statement, it stated: that Zimbabwe was using its regular budget and payments of Congolese entities to finance the war.[203]The UN report claimed that Billy Rautenbach had paid the bonuses of Zimbabwean soldiers. The report also highlighted that two months after the contract of Mr. Rautenbach as Director of Gecamines came to an end, discontent among Zimbabwean soldiers in Katanga over their lack of bonuses was reported. [204]

According to Tapfumaneyi the issue of whose account was funding the war was not important. He argued that there was a constitutional provision that made it mandatory for the government to fund the army.[205] He argued that once the decision to go to war had been taken it was incumbent for the government to support the war whether with or without external assistance.[206] This argument is rather too simplistic to explain who was paying for the bill. The problem with this accession is that it does not specify why the government would then give contradictory accounts on the source of funding the war. It should be noted that against this background of suppression of information by the government it was difficult for the press to cover every aspect of the war.

This section has argued that the private media glaringly covered the economic impact of the war on Zimbabwe it gave minute details of expenses that were being incurred, on the contrary the government tried to shield the issue by giving contradictory statements on whose account was funding the war.

 

Casualty figures: Human Cost of the war

A casualty is a person who is a victim of an accident, injury or trauma. It is the human cost of war. In war terms casualties represent those who are killed, missing, mentally disturbed and those who have been injured who are no longer fit for combat. The state media papered rebel losses, while the independent media focused on the Zimbabwe’s losses.

State media’s reportage on casualties

This section largely depends on The Herald because The Sunday Mail passively reported on this issue. The state media emphasised on the rebel losses arguing that disunity and indiscipline were effects of defeat.

The Herald amplified the divisions between Rwanda and Uganda. According to a piece of writing entitled ‘Congo rebels run amok as allies forces advance’, the Ugandan People Defence Forces (UPDF) accused the Rwandese for not doing well in the South.[207] A journalist in Kampala wrote the article, and this gives the story some degree of creditability due to the proximity of the writer to the conflict area. The Human Rights Watch also reported the divisions between the foreign backers; it stated that the division between Rwanda and Uganda could be traced back to their failure to capture Kinshasa that resulted in their battle for control of RCD. The first military confrontation was reported in August 1999 in the battle for Kisangani that resulted in the defeat of Uganda and death of 200 civilians.[208] After Wamba Dia Wamba’s disposition by Emile llunga, his RCD – Kinshasa was given support by Uganda while RCD remained Rwanda’s assistance. It might be a possibility that the co-operation between Rwanda and Uganda had been a marriage of convenience against a common enemy. It should be of note that states do not have permanent friends but interests.

The state media referred to the resignation of Arthur Aludi from the rebel movement constantly. This story was again used in another story entitled ‘Allies capture or kill 400 DRC rebels’[209]. According to Chari the continual appearance or reference to a story legitimise it, whether it is true or false[210]. In strategic terms the effects of emphasising enemy disunity has a negative psychological bearing on the rebel forces, and it demoralise them. Their will to fight decreases and suspicion against each other increases. According to A. Marshall a military theorist and historian, the indirect way to attack the morale of an opponent is to attack its leadership.[211] However in the case of The Herald its aim as noted in most of its publications was to give positive morale to the SADC allies and the home front. Corporal Gonzo who was operating in Kananga in Kisai province, cited that the reportage on the rebel’s disunity gave them confidence and it reassured them that they would win since their opponent was not unified.[212] On the other hand the paper’s patriotic reportage aimed at boosting the morale of the home front so as to show that the allies were making progress in the war. By amplifying disunity of the top leadership the state media sought to discredit the rebels as a power –hungry confused bunch.

In an article entitled ‘All not well with rebels’ the state media reported that Paul Kagame was said to have physically assaulted Wamba Dia Wamba for a conciliatory stance towards Laurent Kabila after the latter had extended an accommodating hand[213]. There are chances that this story was true although there were no sources that were quoted. Basing on Wamba’s own convictions. Wamba confessed that Thambe Mwanda had insulted him and Tommy Tambwe had on numerous occasions threatened him.[214] Wamba also highlighted that RCD was divided between militarists and democrats. The militarists believed in using force while the democrats were pursuing democratic means. Wamba observed that the rebel movement under the pretext of fighting against dictatorship of Kabila had made another dictatorship, more vicious that combined Mobutist and Kabilist tendencies.[215] 

The divisions within the rebels were not a state media’s construct but a real phenomenon. The Human Rights Watch’s report of 2001 entitled ‘Uganda in DRC: Fuelling political and ethnic strife’ highlighted that there were local leaders, seeking to gain something for their parties or themselves. These leaders were personally exploiting ethnic loyalties and external support to carve out their own areas of influence.[216] The evidence for these divisions is overwhelming, especially in the case of The Rally for Democracy. The rebel group was divided in two antagonistic camps thus RCD Goma supported by Rwanda and RCD-Kisangani supported by Uganda. RCD-Kisangani was changed to Congolese Rally for Democracy Movement for Liberation (RCD ML) within this camp differences between the leadership began to show when Mbusa Nyamwisi ousted Wamba Dia Wamba. RCD ML then mutated to RCD Nationale and RCD Populaire.

The state media focused on the losses of the rebels and it under reported those incurred by Zimbabwe. In the following articles “Allied forces capture or kill 400 DRC rebels” and “SADC allies inflict heavy casualties on invaders”, the reportage remotely touched on Zimbabwean losses. In most cases the state media would report on the casualties as a way to either to correct or respond to what the private media had written. The former editorial stressed that the allies had inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels resulting in the death of 239 rebels towards Kinshasa and Mbuyi Mbuyi and only a single ZDF soldier had been killed. The article was grossly one-sided. The major informant was SADC’s taskforce hence it lacked balance. Such reportage gives evidence that there was some kind of suppression of information the state media was conducting. The article went further to contradict itself. It claimed that the allies had captured or killed some rebels. The use of ‘or’ is questionable how could the army not know the number it had captured. According to C. Hove, this article was “propaganda at its crudest”[217]. He further argues that language suffers in the process of suppressing truth.

The rising casualty figures were linked to indiscipline and gross violation of human rights. The Herald carried reports that accused the rebels of venting their frustration on civilians. The Herald used the same sources in publishing three articles covering how the rebel had killed 500 civilians .The following stories were very sentimental, “Rebels massacre 500 civilians” (7 January 1999),“Rebels leader Ondekane injured as allies forces bombard many targets” (15 January 1999) and “State could have avoided criticism over DRC” (15 June 1999). The first was adapted from the Roman Catholic Missionary News Service. Father G. Albenese reporting from Rome highlighted that many victims had been killed included many women, children and the elderly. The article used the term victim, which implies that people who were killed were innocent and defenceless. The article also described how the orgy killings were conducted using machetes.[218]Such reportage was used to legitimise SADC’s intervention in the same vein this reportage was pointing out that the SADC forces were in the DRC to fight rebel’s barbarism. This was part of the state media’s attempt to discredit the rebels. 

The third article made use of vivid terms such ‘massacre’ as a way to emphasise the point that the rebels were making indiscriminate and merciless killings. The articles used Roman Catholic nuns, the DRC’s church delegation and a Roman Catholic priest as sources of information. The journalist of this article might have deliberately quoted these sources to legitimise his/her allegations, since quoting the parish, as a source is sometimes creditable because there is belief that the Holy Spirit guides it.

A Human Right’s report confirmed that there were indeed human rights violations. According to a Human right’s report Uganda was guilty of killing civilians. Witnesses and saviours reported that the UPDF soldiers rampaged through Maboya and Loya villages, killing eleven people and burning forty-three houses to the ground. A four-month old baby was killed among six people who were burned alive.[219] UPDF was also accused for killing civilians at Mabuku, Butuhe, and Malabako. The Sunday Mail reported that an unnamed organisation and a pastor had witnessed the UPDF placing civilians in an unventilated room to suffocate them and injecting others with the HIV virus.[220]The state media’s reportage tried to cast a shadow on the losses, Zimbabwe was making by amplifying the brutality and losses of the rebels.

The Herald focused on the rebel’s indiscipline. The focus on indiscipline was a deliberate attempt by the state media to show that their role had been positive and the rebels due to defeat had become disunited. The following headlines are classic examples, “Militia groups terrorise country side in Eastern Congo” (1 February 1999), “Rebels run amok as allied forces advance”(6 February 1999), “All not well with rebels” (16 April 1999), “Serious rift in rebel movement” (21 May 1999) and “DRC Rebel clash” (5 January 2002). These articles contained some subtle innuendos, judgments and inference that sought to shape the perception of the readers to accept that SADC was advancing and making tremendous progress. These headlines were portraying rebels in a sinister fashion. The headlines portrayed the rebels as a divided, ineffective and brutal bunch that enjoyed anarchy. According to Rupiya the SADC allies were successful from August 1998 to June after that period there was a stalemate, the rebels had revised their strategies. In the second phase, which started after July, Zimbabwean casualties increased. The allies had made blunder of pursuing the rebels to the East, which was their stronghold. [221]

The Sunday Mail trumpeted the allies’ success in freeing Kinshasa and the reacquisition of the Inga Dam. According to Mahende “For the 16 days …rebels held the Inga dam, they had real power not only over the capital Kinshasa… but over much of Africa”.[222]However, Mahende did not report on the number of casualties that Zimbabwe had incurred in the operation. His article goes to length to describe the strategic importance of the dam without giving intimate information on what had transpired during the capture of the dam. It can be argued that the paper was disinforming the readers. It is evident that state media tried to divert the minds of the people from Zimbabwe’s losses by focusing on the rebel’s.

Private media’s reportage on casualties

The Zimbabwe Independent covered stories that focused on Zimbabwean losses .The paper cited a plethora of reasons why Zimbabwean losses were increasing. The private media observed that the ZDF had under-estimated the enemy numbers. B. Peta quoting an unnamed official source highlighted that; the ZDF had made a strategic blunder of under-estimating the enemy numbers.[223] K. Sakachira argued that 20 000 troops were needed to reverse the rebel’s advance.[224] Even the army admitted that they had employed inferior numbers The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) News magazine, stated that SADC had employed less than 10 000 men and women while Rwanda alone had more than double the figure. Uganda on the other hand, has an estimated 15 000 troops.[225] This is evidence that the SADC forces had under-estimated the enemy. This implies that insufficient intelligence had been carried out prior the campaign. If adequate intelligence gathering had been carried, SADC might have known the amount of forces to employ. One of the greatest military thinkers had written that what enabled a wise sovereign and a good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, was foreknowledge.[226] By foreknowledge he meant intelligence. Sun Tzu also pointed out that, “Know your enemy yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.” The SADC allies by under-estimating the enemy were forced to stay longer in DRC than they had anticipated; they also sustained greater casualties than anticipated. In some cases forces would hoodwink their enemy by giving out deceptive information, especially by feigning inferior numbers so that the enemy would relax in the hope of an easy victory over the numerical inferior army. On the same issue it should be noted that small armies (armies with inferior numbers) have managed to defeat large armies. The Agincourt battle of 1415 is a classic example where, an inferior British army defeated the French.

FIG. 3, Adapted from The Zimbabwe Independent (September 4,1998), p.6.

The Zimbabwe Independent invested more attention on Zimbabwean casualties than the rebel’s. In some cases the private sensationalise and emotionalise issues. FIG.3, depicted Kabila walking on a red carpet dripping with blood saying “your sons are doing well…I am with your soldiers. They have to continue until the enemy is totally defeated”[227] The blood that Kabila is walking on belongs to Zimbabwe’s sons. It can be deduced that blood is used to symbolise Zimbabwean troops that were killed in the DRC war. Ironically Kabila is smiling instead of sympathising with the widows who are depicted as crying. Kabila is pictured as violating the brotherhood between Zimbabwe and DRC, as a ‘brother’ he was suppose to sympathise with Zimbabweans. The diction in the cartoon entrenches the paper’s view that Zimbabwe was losing a lot of men, while Kabila was enjoying himself. A separate article quoted wives of soldiers saying that there were too young to become widows.[228] Kabila was called a ‘blood brother’ a sarcastic term used to show that DRC was a costly enterprise especially in terms of human lives. The agenda, which was set, was that Zimbabwe had to withdraw from the DRC, because the war was socially burdening the country. To make matters worse dying in a foreign country for cloudy reasons was not socially acceptable and justified. According to Mike Kadyauta, father to Evans who had been killed in the DRC argued that it was pathetic for his son to die defending a foreign nation.[229] The private media argued that dying to preserve an illegitimate regime was not worth it hence the government had to withdraw from the DRC. The independent media simply asked ‘Why should Zimbabweans die for DRC?’ It is from this context that it tried to create public awareness by exposing the deaths of Zimbabweans in the DRC.

Contrary to The Herald’s reportage, which had emphasised rebel’s indiscipline, The Zimbabwe Independent focused on the indiscipline of the Zimbabwean troops. In an editorial entitled ‘ZNA dispatches 1500 military police to DRC’ the writer highlighted that there were numerous reports of indiscipline within the army. The article revealed that senior army officials were sporadically reporting for duty and four senior officials had appeared before the court marshal for not reporting for duty.[230] From it should be noted that those in the senior positions are responsible for ensuring discipline, once the top disintegrate so does the army. Colonel Ncube in an interview admitted that there were some soldiers who deserted but however they were few. He stated that in a war situation desertion is expected however during ‘Operation restore Legitimacy’ the numbers were insignificant.[231]Another pointer is the very act of sending the military police. The duty of this force is to ensure discipline in the army; hence it is a possibility that there were some reports of indiscipline. The UN report pointed to some discontentment within the army when some bonuses were not paid. [232]

The above-mentioned article also exposed that indiscipline in the DRC was worsened by inconsistence medical and food supplies in the Eastern part of the Congo.[233]The fact that the state did not discredit this issue, it probably meant that the article had some grain of truth. The article also highlighted that morale among soldiers was plunging because there were heavy casualties. The paper also highlighted that the infiltration of SADC by the rebels triggered blunders. This information had been glossed over by the state media.

Hungwe unearthed what he cited as a ‘monumental disaster’ regarding the ZDF public relations conduct.[234] In an article written in bold entitled “DRC war casualties shock families; give shocking accounts points” carried a story of Evans Kadyauta, an air force officer who had been killed in the DRC and only a part of his leg was buried. The journalist’s sources were credible; he interviewed the priest Reverend Ndungu who presided over the burial, and Evan’s father and sister and the army. Tapfumaneyi’s comment on the story was that it was unpatriotic and irresponsible reporting. He argued that the story was not in any way helping the departed’s relatives but it was traumatising the family adding an unnecessary burden. [235] Hungwe argued that ZDF were handling casualties in a reckless manner, it did not give any explanations surrounding the death of soldiers and to make matters worse no DNA tests were carried to prove that the remains indeed belonged to Evans Kadyauta. Though the story was creditable it was marred with emotional language. Hungwe emphasised the descriptions of ‘Evans remains’.[236] This was carried in a repeating fashion. The writer made use of these statements, “Their son returned to them as part of a leg”, “Heap of human tissue”, “Evans had on bone at all but only pieces of the leg” and “He had no hand at all”. Hungwe’s article emphasised the descriptions of the Evans more than anything. Tapfumaneyi pointed out that in a war situation mutilations of victims is excepted as it is used to discourage or demoralise the opponent.[237] In ancient Europe, armies would use decapitated heads of the opponents, as bombs to psychologically dislocate their opponent will to fight. This act would negatively impact on the fighting of the adversary. The state tried by all means to disinform and misinform the public on the human cost of the war, according to Hungwe the government would merely refuse to comment or give misleading and conflicting information.[238] The state media on the other side did not report on such negative aspects of the war, it kept a more optimistic line of reportage. The private media was concerned with issues that the public media were superficially reporting such as the Zimbabwean casualties, and indiscipline in the war.

Withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The withdrawal of Zimbabwe forces from the DRC was not a topical issue since the issue was over-shadowed by other issues such as the presidential elections. The private media came to the conclusion Zimbabwean troops came from the DRC a bitter nation. It felt that the Lusaka agreement was a face-saving agreement; Zimbabwe could not accept defeat. The paper also pointed out that if Zimbabwe had won the war why did it sign the peace agreements when the rebels were holding territory within DRC especially in the East. Muleya cited that the rebels were occupying half of the Congo and this had triggered questions, whether the SADC allies had done anything more than save Kabila.[239] On the other hand The Herald argued that SADC withdrew because they had accomplished their mission. Their argument was that Operation Restore Legitimacy had repulsed Rwanda and Uganda from occupying the centre of gravity, which was Kinshasa. According to Ncube, Kinshasa was the nerve centre of the DRC and its occupation would have meant the downfall of Kabila.[240]Mahachi pointed out that Zimbabwe had lost few men but it was heartening to know that the Congolese were grateful. He cited “Each time they see Zimbabweans they great us with tears of appreciation and joy”.[241] This point shows that Zimbabwean troops and its allies, according to this statement, had enjoyed an upper hand. On the contrary the rebels argued that the so- called SADC victory over Kinshasa was only a strategic retreat so that the destruction and infrastructure would be limited.[242] This shows that truth is hard to come by during war. Truth becomes a casualty of war.

According to Hungwe, Zimbabwe managed to put ‘a brave show’, though it was not defeated in the war it wasted the economic resources of this country.[243]Gutsa seems to share the same view; he traces the present economic problems to the Zimbabwe’s military involvement in the DRC.[244]The analysis of this paper argues that the withdrawal of Zimbabwe did not mean that there was absolute peace. The DRC war up to this day is still being fought.

The conclusions that can be drawn is that the intervention was as controversial as the withdrawal. The state and private media gave different reasons for the withdrawal of the forces from the DRC.

Lessons learnt

It has been observed from the previous sections that war reportage is a critical matter, which policy makers need to take into account. The DRC war is a case in point where the state and the private media gave completely different accounts, interpretations and conclusions. Selective reportage, half–truths and exaggerations characterised the reportage

The government should be open –minded in supplying information to both the public and private media. The government was blamed for alienating the private media and favouring The Herald. According to Ncube, journalists from the state media like and ZTV The Sunday Mail and The Herald were constantly given escorted visits to DRC while the private were not.[245]Hungwe also highlighted that the only way they could get access information was through press conference but these could not entirely compensate for escorted visits. According to an editorial comment reflecting the views of The Zimbabwe Independent, “The Independent asked for its journalist to go Congo…but certain people in the military hierarchy did not want us in Congo.”[246] The private media had to rely on telephone calls to get information as well Trans-media reports for example Reuters, AFP and BBC.[247]The private media argued that press conferences and press statements were not the only exclusive tools for government to communicate its viewpoints; there was a need for journalists to witness the war they were reporting on.

As for the journalist, responsible and patriot reporting is needed especially when a country is at war so that the lives of the troops are not compromised. The private media should not act as a fifth column of the enemy. Emotional reportage should be avoided and pave way for objective reportage. However the private media should be commented for bringing to light issues the state media was reluctant to report on for example the issue of casualties and expenditure as well as the effects of the war on the economy.

In conclusion the military and the media needs each other, there should be a degree of cooperation to avoid a scenario where the media would divulge information that could jeopardise the state. The research has also noted that there were constrained relations between the private media and the state media.

                                                    Conclusion

This research pointed out that analysis, comments, opinions, interviews and reportage in general by the media slanted in favour of Zimbabwe and SADC allies or the rebels. There were skewed presentations that focused totally on the negatives of either Zimbabwe or on the rebels. Furthermore there were calculated bias in the reportage whether intended or unintended which either glorified or castigated the Zimbabwean military involvement in the DRC. The Herald and The Sunday Mail gave administrative perceptions of the war, thus the government view. The state media employed a dialect of legitimating, in other words it tried to convince the reader that there was procedural consensus in the intervention and it branded the media that opposed the intervention an unpatriotic hostile media and a fifth column of the enemy. The Independent media on one hand questioned policy makers on matters they felt affected the welfare of the state such as war expenditure, casualties and reasons for intervention. The private media tried to inform and raise public awareness by exposing the contradictions surrounding the intervention as well strategic blunders.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.    Primary Sources

A.1. Newspapers

Ankomah B., “Sanctions, which sanctions?” in New African, Summer 2007.

     Ankomah, B., “SADC cannot abandon Zimbabwe”, in New African, Summer 2007.

Cartoon, “The cost of sustaining Mugabe’s ego”, in The Zimbabwe Independent September 4, 1998.

Chinaka, C., “Mugabe stakes prestige on adventure in Congo jungle”, in The Financial Gazette, August 27, 1998.

Chirume. C., “Role of the media in developing world”, in The Sunday Mail, March 14 1999.

Comment, ‘Comment’, in The Zimbabwe Independent in 21 August 1998.

Comment, “Kabila’s wages of sin return to haunt him” in Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998.

Comment, “Pressure mounts on Mugabe to withdrew troops from the DRC”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, October, 30,1998.

Dzirutwe, F., Ministry faces problems, in The Sunday Mail, August 30, 1998.

Financial Gazette, “Zim sends soldiers to help Kabila”, in The Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998.

Gabi, M., “Business chances versus possible risks in the DRC”, in The Sunday Mail, May 23,1999.

Herald Reporter, “All not well with Rebels”, in The Herald, April 16, 1999.

Herald reporter, “Zim dismisses UN report on DRC”, in The Herald, November 21,2001.

 Hove .C, “People, language and truth: casualties in any war”, March 12, 1999.

Kwete, W., “The DRC rebel praises SADC forces”, in The Sunday Mail, September 5,1998.

Lovell. J, “DRC years of foreign troops”, in The Financial Gazette, September 3, 1998. 

Mahende, E., “Inga dam: What was at stake”, in The Sunday Mail, September 20,1998.

Mahoso, T., “Research vital to reporting”, in The Sunday Mail, June 13,1999.

Mahoso. T., “Church can play major in the DRC conflict”, in The Sunday Mail, June 20, 1999.

Mahoso. T., “The Independent press and the issue of intervention”, Sunday Mail, September 13,1998.

Matarire. L., “Church leaders endorse SADC effort in DRC conflict”, in The Sunday Mail, June 13,1999.

Mudeya .D “DRC Jungle becomes Mugabe’s waterloo” in The Zimbabwe Independent, April 1,1999.

Ndlela .D, “Mugabe’s DRC move comes under fire”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 21,1998.

Nyoni, N., “Ex –Army chief takes Mugabe to ask”, in Financial Gazette, August 27,1998.

Peta. B., “Zimbabwe count cost of Congo war”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, September 4,1998.

Political Analyst, “Rebel leader Wamba Dia Wamba”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, 6 November 1998.

Reporter,  “Zim dismisses UN report on DRC”, in The Herald, November 21, 2001.

Sigauke. F., “Zim, DRC trade ties strengthen” in Sunday Mail, November 8,1998.

Staff reporter, “Zim sends soldiers to help Kabila”, in Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998.

Staff Writer,  “Zim delays offensive on the DRC eastern front”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 20, 1998.

Sunday Mail reporter, “Journalists notes confisticated, another arrested in UK”, Sunday Mail, January 31,1999.

Sunday Mail, “Congo talks fail to take off as rebels stay away”, Sunday Mail, January 17,1999.

Takaona, “M. Mudenge rules out compromises ion DRC”, in The Sunday Mail, October 25,1998.

The Herald “DRC Rebels massacre 500”, in The Herald, January 7,1999.

The Herald Reporter, “Police pick up scribes”, in The Herald, February 9,1999.

The Herald, “Intervention meant to create stability”, in The Herald, August 25,1999.

The Sunday Mail, “Anti-Congo demonstration falters as alliance splits”, in The Sunday Mail, October 25, 1998.

The Sunday Mail, “Rebel split threatens DRC peace Accord, in The Sunday Mail, July 11, 1999.

The Zimbabwe Independent, “DRC financing its war costs –Kabila”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, March 19, 1999.

Zindi, E., “Zimbabweans support intervention”, in The Sunday Mail, August 23,1998.

Zindi, E., Non participants also has a role in the DRC conflict, Sunday Mail, May 30 1999.

A.2 Interviews

Interview with A. S Tapfumaneyi (approximate age 43), 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

Interview with B. Ncube (approximate age 48), 02 April 2007, Defence House, Harare.

Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37),) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

Interview with J. Gutsa an employee of National Railways participant in Chitungwiza riot (approximate 50) 18 June 2007,Hillside, Harare.

Interview with, Corporal Gonzo (approximately age 31), 02 January 2007,Mbizo 1 extension, Kwekwe.

 Interview with, T.J. Chari (approximate age 46), 01 December 2006, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

A.3 Letter

Gasana. A., Letter dated 23 October 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nation addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations, 2002.

B. Secondary Sources

B.1 Published Sources

Baregu, M, “The DRC war and the second scramble for Africa”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999.

Campbell, H, Democratisation, Citizenship and peace in Congo, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999.

 Chari, T. J., Mabaso. C and Muchena etal., Introduction to Print Media, Zimbabwe, Open University, Harare, 2003.

Chinyanganya, T.L., “Media discourse in Zimbabwe: A comparative analysis of the reporting on farm occupations/ invasions in the month of May 2000 by two Zimbabwe dailies, The Herald and the Daily News”, Thesis. Department of Linguistics, University of Zimbabwe, 2001.

Chitiyo. K, and Rupiya. M., “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history; The Zimbabwe defence forces 1980-2005”, in M. Rupiya, Evolutions and Revolutions, Pretoria, Institute of Defence Studies, 2005.

Cilliers, J. and Malan, M., “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001.

Cilliers, J., “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001.

Comment, “Allied forces halt invaders despite proximity”, The Zimbabwean National Army Magazine, May 1999.

Feltoe, G., “Media Laws in Zimbabwe”, in G. Mudzongo, F. G. Chiweshe and P. Matsheza (ed.), Human Rights and the Media, Harare, SAHRIT, 2002.

Galloucis, S., “Military –media relations: One Officer’s perceptive”, in Military Review: The professional journal of the US Army, September-October 1999.

Goodwin .E., Grouping for ethics in journalism, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1987.

Hultang, J. L., The messengers’ motive: ethical problems of the news media, New Jersey, Stanford University, 1985.

Hungwe, B., “DRC war casualties shock families; give shocking accounts points”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, 30 April 1999.

International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa’s Seven-Nation War: Democratic Republic of Congo Report, No. 4, 21 May 1999.

IOL, “Zim marks 'subsequent economic meltdown' ”, in IOL, November 10, 2007.

Khan, A. W., “Journalism and armed conflict in Africa: The civil war in Sierra Leone” in Review of African Political economy, Vol 25, No 75, December 1998.

Kitzinger. J., “Media Coverage of Sexual Violence against women and children’ in K. Ross (ed), Women and media, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2004.

Leith, R. & Solomon H., “Understanding State failure in Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies, Vol 1,No 2,November, 2000.

Makonero. W., “Background to the conflict and instability in the African Great Lakes region”, in C. Kadima and C.Kabemba, Wither Regional peace and security? The Democratic Republic of Congo after the war, Pretoria, African Institution of South Africa, 2000.

Mandaza, I., “Why Wamba should be heard” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999

Manungo, K., “Zimbabwe”, in G. Cawthra and A. Omari (ed), Security and Democracy in Southern Africa, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2007.

 Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending         December 1999, Harare, Government Printer, 1998.

Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 2000, Harare, Government Printer, 1999.

Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December     2001, Harare, Government Printer, 1999.

Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 2001,Government Harare, Printer, 1999.

Nandi. C., Print Media and Photojournalism, New Dehli, Ansari Rd., 2006.

 Ncube, B., “An evaluation of the Zimbabwean Sunday Mail coverage of peacekeeping operation in Somalia 1992-1994”, Honours Dissertation, Zimbabwe Open University, 2006.

Ndlela, D., “Mugabe’s DRC move comes under fire”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 21, 1998.

New African, ‘Zimbabweans condemn Congo’, in New Africa, January, No 370,1999.

Parliamentary Debate, Vol 25, No 58,1999.

Pippert, W.G., An ethics’ of news; a reporter search for truth, Georgetown, Georgetown University, 1989.

Plano, J. C, and Olton R. (etal.), The International Relations Dictionary, Oxford, Western Michigan University, 1982.

Pumungwe. G., “The SADC organ on politics, defence and security”, in M.Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999.

RCD, “Angola and Zimbabwe troops in our country”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999.

Rupiya, M., “A political and military review of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo war” in J. Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo war, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Ruzvidzo, V, “Zim troops won’t leave DRC say Mahachi”, in The Herald, May, 4,1999.

Sithole, M, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Harare, Rujeko Publishers 1998.

Sithole, M., Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Harare, Rujeko Publishers, 1998.

Skelton, I., “Its aren’t new”, in Aerospace Journal, 2000.

Sun Tzu, The art of war, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1981.

Tapfumaneyi A.W, “Some reflections on the current conflict in the DRC; Explaining Zimbabwe’s military intervention”, in M.Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Oxford, London, 1963.

Tomasell, K., Tomasell. R., and Muller J., “The construction of News in the South African Media”, in Tomasell (ed) The Press in South Africa, James Currey Ltd, London, 1989.

Waldahl, R., Politics and persuasion: Media coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election, Weaver Press, University of Oslo, 2004.

Zimbabwe Treasury Quarterly Bulletin, July-December 2002, Issue 3.

ZNA reporter, “Life normal in Western DRC”, in The ZNA magazine, May 1999.

B 2. Unpublished Sources

Mazarire, G., and Rupiya, M., “Two wrongs not a right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes 1980-2000” (unpublished manuscript).

Ngoma. N, ‘the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Choices and implications for the Southern African Development Community’ Centre for Southern African Studies (unpublished manuscript).

Rupiya .M, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’, August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.3.

Tapfumaneyi .A.W, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, (unpublished manuscript).

B3. Published Internet Sources

Harmon, K., and Barouski. D., ‘Suffering in the Congo’ Http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2006/snow0706.html / Accessed as a printed article.

Monograph No 66Ocober 2001 “Peacekeeping in the DRC, Monuc and the road to peace” www.iss.co.za January 20, 2007.

Oxfam report (online), +http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Zimbabwe-DRC.html, Accessed, October 9, 2007.

International Peace Service http://www.namibian.com.na/2002/January/world/02399BB1D9.html, Accessed, October 9, 2007.

http://www.hrforumzim.com/reports/tort990003/torture990003b.htm, accessed November 8,2007.

Amnesty report 1998 (online) http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/afr46.htm, Accessed November 8,1998.

---

[1]  R. Waldahl, Politics and persuasion: Media coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election, University of Oslo, Weaver Press, 2004, p.10.

[2] The Financial Gazette, “Zim sends soldiers to help Kabila”, in The Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998, p.1.

[3] G. Feltoe, “Media Laws in Zimbabwe”, in G. Mudzongo, F. G. Chiweshe and P. Matsheza (ed.), Human Rights and the Media, Harare, SAHRIT, 2002, p.89.

[4] E. Goodwin, Grouping for ethics in journalism, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1987,p. 2.

[5] G. Feltoe, “Media Laws in Zimbabwe”, in G. Mudzongo, F. G. Chiweshe and P. Matsheza (ed.), Human Rights and the Media, Harare, SAHRIT, 2002, p.91.

[6]Ibid., p.91.

[7]Ibid., p.89-90.

[8] The Sunday Mail reporter, “Journalists notes confisticated, another arrested in UK”, in The Sunday Mail January 31,1999, p.1.

[9] B. Ankomah, “SADC cannot abandon Zimbabwe”, in New African, Summer 2007,p. 13.

[10] G. Feltoe, “Media Laws in Zimbabwe”, in G. Mudzongo, F. G. Chiweshe and P. Matsheza (ed.), Human Rights and the Media, Harare, SAHRIT, 2002, pp.89-90.

[11] Ibid., pp.90-91.

[12] Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37), Journalist, 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[13] Interview with J. Gutsa (approximate 50), Participant in Chitungwiza riot, 18 June 2007,Hillside, Harare.

[14]Interview with J. Gutsa (approximate 50) 18 June 2007,Hillside, Harare.           

[15] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[16] The private media argued that the DRC war was for Mugabe’s prestige and personal profiteering. The state media had argued that the war was to preserve the sovereignty of the DRC against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

[17] The DRC war is also known as the Second Congo war. The First Congo (1996-1997) resulted in the replacing of Mobutu by Kabila.

[18] K. Tomasell, R Tomasell and J. Muller, “The construction of News in the South African Media”, in Tomasell (ed) The Press in South Africa, James Currey Ltd, London , 1989, p.28.

[19] J. Kitzinger, “Media Coverage of Sexual Violence against women and children’ in K. Ross (ed) , Women and media ,Blackwell Publishing , Malden, 2004,p.23.

[20] R. Waldahl, Politics and persuasion: Media coverage of Zimbabwe’s 2000 election, University of Oslo, Weaver Press, 2004, p.87.

[21] T.L, Chinyanganya, “Media discourse in Zimbabwe: A comparative analysis of the reporting on farm occupations/ invasions in the month of May 2000 by two Zimbabwe dailies, The Herald and The Daily News”, Thesis. Department of Linguistics, University of Zimbabwe, 2001.

[22]B. Ncube,  “An evaluation of the Zimbabwean The Sunday Mail’s coverage of peacekeeping operation in Somalia 1992-1994”, Honours Dissertation, Zimbabwe Open University, 2006.

[23] A. W. Khan, “Journalism and armed conflict in Africa: The civil war in Sierra Leone” in Review of African Political economy, Vol 25, No 75, December 1998, p. 585.

[24] K. Tomasell, R Tomasell and J. Muller, “The construction of News in the South African Media”, in Tomasell (ed) The Press in South Africa, James Currey Ltd, London, 1989, p.28.

[25] Wamba Dia Wamba, “Crisis in the Congolese Rally for Democracy: Struggle of antagonist political lines”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.107.

[26] M. Baregu, “The DRC war and the second scramble for Africa”, in M.Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999,p.39

[27] G. Pumungwe, “The SADC organ on politics, defence and security”, in M.Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999, p.139.

[28] J. C, Plano and R. Olton (etal.), The International Relations Dictionary, Oxford, Western Michigan University, 1982, p.9.

[29] N. Ngoma, ‘The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Choices and implications for the Southern African Development Community’ Centre for Southern African Studies (unpublished manuscript). p.3.

[30] Ibid., p.3.

[31] I. G. Shivji, “The Congo Crisis: A replay of the Middle East?” in Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.65.

[32] A.W, Tapfumaneyi, “Some reflections on the current conflict in the DRC; Explaing Zimbabwe’s military intervention”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999,p.122.

[33] Ibid., p.119.

[34] L. Scholtz, “The media and the military: Allies or Adversaries”, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military studies, VoI 28,No 2,1998,p.237.

[35] K Harmon and D. Barouski, “Suffering in the Congo” Http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2006/snow0706.html / Accessed as an printed article

Foreign players include states, multi-national mining companies like Barrack Gold, Forrest Group and Gecamines among others, and Private military constructors like Brown and Root.

[36]Ibid.

[37]International Peace Service, http://www.namibian.com.na/2002/January/world/02399BB1D9.html, Accessed, October 9, 2007.

[38] Ibid.

[39] UN report (online), +http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Zimbabwe-DRC.html.

[40] I. G. Shivji, “The Congo Crisis: A replay of the Middle East?” in Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.65.

[41] Comment, “Kabila’s wages of sin return to haunt him” in The Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998,p. 8.

[42] M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.3.

[43] International Crisis Group (ICG), Africa’s Seven-Nation War: Democratic Republic of Congo Report, No. 4, 21 May 1999,p. 8.

[44] NB The Hutu had perpetrated genocide acts against the Tutsi, but was later repulsed from Rwanda resulting them into taking refugee in Eastern Congo.

[45]J. Cilliers and M. Malan, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.19.

[46] Monograph No 66 October 2001 “Peacekeeping in the DRC, Monuc and the road to peace” www.iss.co.za January 20, 2007.

[47] M. Rupiya, “A political and military review of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo war”, in J Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo war, New York, Palgrave Macmilian, 2002,p. 94.

[47]M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.4.

[48] M. Rupiya, “A political and military review of Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Second Congo war”, in J Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo war, New York, Palgrave Macmilian, 2002,p. 94.

[49]M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.4.

[50] Ibid., p. 95.

[51] The Sunday Mail, “Congo talks fail to take off as rebels stay away”, The Sunday Mail, January 17,1999, p.1.

[52] A.W Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (unpublished manuscript) p.3.

[53] Monograph No 66Ocober 2001 “Peacekeeping in the DRC, Monuc and the road to peace” www.iss.co.za January 20, 2007.

[54] Staff reporter, “Zim sends soldiers to help Kabila”, in The Financial Gazette, August 6, 1998,p. 1.

[55] W. Kwete, “The DRC rebel praises SADC forces”, in The Sunday Mail , September 5,1998, p.3.

[56] F. Reynjens, “Briefing; The Second Congo war more than a remake” in African Affairs, no 98, 1999,p. 243.

[57] E. Zindi, Non participants also has a role in the DRC conflict, The Sunday Mail, May 30 1999, p.11.

[58] A.W. Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo,(unpublished manuscript) p.2.

[59] H.Campbell, “Note of the pace of the struggle for a new mode of politics in the Congo,” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.61.

[60] E. Goodwin, Grouping for ethics in journalism, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1987,p. 2.

[61] T. Mahoso, “Research vital to reporting “, in The Sunday Mail, June 13,1999,p.6.

[62] Editorial Comment, “The cost of sustaining Mugabe’s ego”, in Zimbabwe Independent, August 28,1998, p.4.

[63] S. Galloucis, “Military –media relations: One Officer’s perceptive”, in Military Review: The professional journal of the US Army, September-October 1999,p. 77.

[64] Interview with B. Ncube (approximate age 48) SADC spokesman, 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[65] A.W, Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, (unpublished manuscript) p. 2.

[66] M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.5.

[67] Y. Bangura, “Comments on Regional Security and the war in the Congo”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.27.

[68]G. Pumungwe, “The SADC organ on politics, defence and security”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999, p.139.

N.B Pumungwe confused his dates the meeting which he referred to was in 1996

[69] Ibid., p.127

[70] H.Campbell, “Note of the pace of the struggle for a new mode of politics in the Congo,” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.61.

[71] I. Skelton , “Its aren’t new”, in Aerospace Journal ,2000,p.6.

[72] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essay, October 1997-October 1998, p.149.

[73] Campbell, “Note of the pace of the struggle for a new mode of politics in the Congo,” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999

[74] H. Campbell, “Democratisation, Citizenship and peace in Congo”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999,p.34.

[75] J. Cilliers and M. Malan, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.20.

[76] RCD, “Angola and Zimbabwe troops in our country”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.36.

[77]A. Gasana, Letter dated 23 October 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nation addressed to the President of the Security Council, United Nations, 2002, p.6.

N.B Genocidiers refers to those who had perpetuated the Rwandan genocide

[78] Ibid., p.9.

[79] Ibid., p.5.

[80] W. Makonero, “Background to the conflict and instability in the African Great Lakes region”, in C. Kadima and C.Kabemba, Wither Regional peace and security? The Democratic Republic of Congo after the war, Pretoria, African Institution of South Africa, 2000,p.72.

[81] G. Pumungwe, “The SADC organ on politics, defence and security”, in M.Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999, p.139.

[82] The Zimbabwe Independent, “Pressure mounts on Mugabe to withdraw” in The Zimbabwe Independent, October 30, 1998,p.2.

[83] RCD, “Angola and Zimbabwe troops in our country”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.35.

[84] The Zimbabwe Independent, “Editorial Comment” in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 21, 1998,p.4.

[85] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Rujeko Publishers Harare, 1998,p. 127.

[86] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essay, October 1997-October 1998, p.128.

[87] Political Analyst, “Rebel leader Wamba Dia Wamba”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, 6 November 1998,p.3.

[88] Ibid p.3

[89] N. Masiwa, “The Congo wilderness”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.79.

[90] Ibid., p.79.

[91] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Harare, Rujeko Publishers, 1998,p.150.

[92]Interview with B.  Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[93] See page 77.

[94] Special Correspondent, “Why SADC allied forces in the DRC”, in The Herald, June 12, 1999p.1.

[95] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[96] I. Mandaza, “Why Wamba should be heard” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.23.

[97] R. Leith & H. Solomon, “Understanding State failure in Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo”, in Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies, Vol 1,No 2,November, 2000,p 45.

[98] The war, which is referred to here, is the First Congo war 1996.

[99] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[100] Special Correspondent, “Why SADC allied forces in the DRC”, in The Herald, June 12, 1999p.1.

[101]A.W, Tapfumaneyi, “Some reflections on the current conflict in the DRC; Explain Zimbabwe’s military intervention”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999,p.116.

[102] K. Manungo, “Zimbabwe”, in G. Cawthra and A. Omari (ed), Security and Democracy in Southern Africa, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2007,p.228. 

[103] J. Lovell, “DRC years of foreign troops”, in The Financial Gazette, September 3, 1998,p.4. 

[104] W.G Pippert, An ethics of news; a reporter search for truth, Georgetown University, Georgetown 1989,p.3.

[105] D. Mudeya “DRC Jungle becomes Mugabe’s waterloo” in The Zimbabwe Independent, April 1,1999 p.4

[106] K. Chitiyo, M. Rupiya, “Tracking Zimbabwe’s political history; The Zimbabwe defence forces 1980-2005”, in M. Rupiya, Evolutions and Revolutions, Pretoria, Institute of Defence Studies, 2005,p.358.

[107] Comment, “Pressure mounts on Mugabe to withdrew troops from the DRC”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, October 30,1998,p. 4.

[108] C. Chinaka , “Mugabe stakes prestige on adventure in Congo jungle” ,in  The Financial Gazette ,August 27, 1998,p. 8.

[109]J. Lovell, “DRC years of foreign troops”, in The Financial Gazette, September 3, 1998,p.4.   

[110] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Rujeko Publishers Harare, 1998,p. 150.

[111] Reporter,  “Zim dismisses UN report on DRC”, in The Herald, November 21,2001,p.1.

[112] Ibid.,p.8.

[113] I. G. Shivji, “The Congo Crisis :A replay of the Middle East?”, in Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.65.

[114] Parliamentary Debates, Vol 25, No 58, p.4278.

[115] G. Mazarire and M. Rupiya, “Two wrongs not a right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes 1980-2000” (unpublished manuscript), p.9.

NB: Used draft.

[116] Ibid., p.9.

[117] Ibid.,p.9.

[118] IOL, “Zim marks 'subsequent economic meltdown' ”, in IOL, November 10, 2007.p.1.

[119] The Herald, “Intervention meant to create stability”, in The Herald, August 28, 1998, p. 4.

[120] The Victoria Falls meeting was held on the 18^th of August 1998 and the falling day Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe announced that they were going to give Kabila aid.

The meeting at Luanda of 8 April 1998 resulted in the signing of a Defence Protocol between the allies under article 4 and 11.

[121]The Zimbabwe Independent, “Editorial Comment” in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 21,1998,p.4.

[122] J. Cilliers, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.15.

[123] Ibid.,p.15. 

[124] A.W Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (unpublished manuscript) p.7.

[125] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[126] Y. Bangura, “Comments on Regional Security and the war in the Congo”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.27.

[127] J. Cilliers, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.15.

[128] The Zimbabwe Independent, “Editorial Comment” in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 21,1998,p.4.

[129] RCD, “Angola and Zimbabwe troops in our country”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999, p.35.

[130] A.W Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (unpublished manuscript) p.2.

[131] Herald reporter, “Rebel leader Ondelane injured as allies forces bombard enemy attacks”, in The Herald, January 15,1999,p. 1.

[132] L. Matarire, “Church leaders endorse SADC effort in DRC conflict”, in The Sunday Mail, June 13,1999,p.1.

[133] E. Zindi, “Zimbabweans support intervention”, in The Sunday Mail, August 23,1998, p.1.

[134] L. Scholtz, “The media and the military: Allies or Adversaries”, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military studies, VoI 28,No 2,1998,p.237.

[135] T. Mahoso, “Church can play major in the DRC conflict”, in The Sunday Mail, June 20, 1999,p. C 1

[136] See Page 68.

[137] Sun Tzu, The art of war, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1981, p. 19.

[138] Interview with B.  Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[139] N. Nyoni, “Ex- army chief takes Mugabe to task”, in Financial Gazette, August 27,1998,p.2.

[140] T. Mahoso, “Church can play major in the DRC conflict”, in The Sunday Mail, June 20, 1999,p. C 1.

[141] The Zimbabwe Independent, “DRC talks overshadowed by riots”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 6,1998,p.6.

[142] N. Nyoni, “Ex –Army chief takes Mugabe to ask”, in The Financial Gazette, August 27,1998, p.1.

[143] Ibid., p.1.

[144] B.  Ankomah, “Sanctions, which sanctions?” in New African, Summer 2007,p.81.

[145] Parliamentary Debate, Vol 25, No 58, p.4278.

[146] Zimbabwe Treasury Quarterly Bulletin, July-December 2002, Issue 3, p.16.

[147] M. Gabi, “Business chances versus possible risks in the DRC”, in The Sunday Mail, May 23,1999,p.8.

[148] Ibid., p.8.

[149] M. Gabi, “Business chances versus possible risks in the DRC”, in The Sunday Mail, May 23,1999,p.8.

[150] A.W Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (unpublished manuscript) p.18.

[151] M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty ”(unpublished manuscript) p.10.

[152] ZNA reporter, “Life normal in Western DRC”, in The ZNA magazine, May 1999, p.13.

[153] Ibid., p.119.

[154] The Herald, “Intervention meant to create stability”, in The Herald, August 25,1998,p. 1.

[155] E. Mahende, “Inga Dam: What was at stake”, in The Sunday Mail, October 11, 1998,p.9.

[156] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007, Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[157] T. Mahoso, “What is at stake in the Congo: A disservice by the Independent press”, in The Sunday Mail, August 30,1998,p.11.

[158] A.W Tapfumaneyi, The Zimbabwe Defence Forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (unpublished manuscript) p.16.

[159] Oxfam report (online), +http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Zimbabwe-DRC.html, Accessed, October 9, 1999.

[160] Ibid.

[161] Ibid.

[162] N. Masiwa, “The Congo wilderness”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.79.

[163] New African, “Zimbabweans condemn Congo”, in New Africa, January, No 370,1999,p.19.

[164] The Herald, “Intervention meant to create stability”, in The Herald, August 25,1998,p. 1.

[165] O. Maruma, “Lessons on the Democratic Republic of Congo war”, in The Herald, January, 31, 1999.p.1.

[166] The Sunday Mail, “Rebel split threatens DRC peace Accord, in The Sunday Mail, July 11, 1999, p.11.

[167] M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.6.

[168] Herald Reporter, “MP urges Government to readily give information on DRC”, The Herald, May 5,1999,p.4.

[169] Staff Writer,  “Zim delays offensive on the DRC eastern front”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 20, 1998, p.4.

[170] J. Cilliers and M. Malan, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.25.

[171] Oxfam report (online), +http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Zimbabwe-DRC.html, Accessed, October 9, 1999.

[172] J. Cilliers and M. Malan, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.21.

[173] F. Dzirutwe, “Ministry faces problems”, in The Sunday Mail, August 30, 1998,p.1.

[174] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[175] K. Manungo, “Zimbabwe”, in G. Cawthra and A. Omari (ed), Security and Democracy in Southern Africa, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2007,p.229.

[176] The Zimbabwe Independent, “DRC talks overshadowed by riots”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 6,1998,p.6.

[177]  New African, “Zimbabweans condemn Congo”, in New Africa, January, No 370,1999,p.19.

[178] Interview with J. Gutsa pseudo (approximate 50), participant in Chitungwiza riot and employee of National Railways of Zimbabwe 18 June 2007,Hillside, Harare.

[179] Amnesty report 1998 (online) http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/afr46.htm, Accessed November 9, 2007.

[180] The Sunday Mail, “Anti-Congo demonstration falters as alliance splits”, in The Sunday Mail, October 25, 1998,p. 1. 

[181] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[182] N. Nyoni, “Ex- army chief takes Mugabe to task”, in The Financial Gazette, August 27,1998,p.2.

[183] Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[184] C, Chirume, “Role of the media in developing world”, in The Sunday Mail, March 14 1999,p.6.

[185] Ibid., p.6.

[186] T. Mahoso, “Research vital to reporting”, in The Sunday Mail, June 13,1999, p.6.

[187] Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[188] M. Sithole, Zimbabwe's public eye: political essays, October 1997-October 1998, Rujeko Publishers Harare, 1998,p.150.

[189] B. Peta, “Zimbabwe count cost of Congo war”, The Zimbabwe Independent, September 4, 1998,p.3.

[190] Ibid., p.3.

[191] Comment, “Allied forces halt invaders despite proximity”, in The Zimbabwean National Army Magazine, May 1999, p.1.

[192] Staff writer,“Zim delays offensive in DRC Eastern Front”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 20, 1998,p.3.

[193] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[194] Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 1999, Harare, Government Printer, 1998,p.10.

[195] Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 2000, Harare, Government Printer, 1999,p.10.

[196]N.B The first endnote represent the first figure and the second the next figure.

 Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 2001,Government Printer, Harare, 1999,p.10.

Ministry of finance, Budget Millennium: Budget estimates: for the year ending December 2001,Government Printer, Harare, 1999,p.10.

[197] Staff reporter, “Harare's War Chest Gobbles Up $16.2 Billion”, in The Financial Gazette, February 14, 2002,p. 1.

[198] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[199] V. Ruzvidzo, “Zim troops wont leave DRC says Mahachi”, in The Herald, May 4, 1999,p.1.

[200] http://www.hrforumzim.com/reports/tort990003/torture990003b.htm, Accessed November 8, 2007.

[201]The Zimbabwe Independent “DRC financing its war costs –Kabila”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, March 19 1999,A1.

[202] J. Cilliers and M. Malan, “Peacekeeping in the DRC; Monuc and the road to peace”, ISS Monograph, No 66, 2001, p.21.

[203] UN report (online), +http://www.edcnews.se/Research/Zimbabwe-DRC.html.

[204] Ibid.

[205] A.W, Tapfumaneyi, “Some reflections on the current conflict in the DRC; Explaing Zimbabwe’s military intervention”, in M. Baregu, Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes books, 1999,p.114.

[206] Ibid.,p.114.

[207] D. Balikowe, “Congo rebels run amok as allies forces advance”, in The Herald, February 6,1999,p.1.

[208] Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda in DRC: Fuelling political and ethnic strife’, March 2000,Vol 13,No 2(A), p.10.

[209] Herald reporter, “Allies capture or kill 400 DRC rebels”, in The Herald, February 20, 1999,p.2.

[210] Interview with, T.J. Chari (approximate age 46) Media analyst, 01 December 2006, University of Zimbabwe, Harare.

[211] J. Sweetnam, “When stars do not align”, in Military Review, March –April 2000,p.61.

[212] Interview with, Corporal Gonzo (approximately age 31), 02 January 2007,Mbizo 1 extension, Kwekwe.

N.B According to Gonzo newspapers were read during their brief stay in Zimbabwe and sometimes those who would be coming from Zimbabwe brought them to the front.

[213] Herald Reporter, “All not well with Rebels”, in The Herald, April 16, 1999,p.1.

[214] Wamba Dia Wamba, “Crisis in the Congolese Rally for Democracy: Struggle of antagonist political lines”, in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999,p.107.

[215] Ibid., p.107.

[216] Human Rights Watch, “Uganda in DRC: Fuelling political and ethnic strife”, in Human Rights, March 2000,Vol 13,No 2(A), p.5.

[217] C. Hove, “People, language and truth: casualties in any war”, in Zimbabwe Independent, March 12, 1999,p.12.

[218] The Herald, “DRC Rebels massacre 500”, in The Herald, January 7,1999,p.1.

[219] Human Rights Watch, “Uganda in DRC: Fuelling political and ethnic strife”, in Human rights, March 2000,Vol 13,No 2(A), p. 34.

[220] The Sunday Mail, “Rebel split threatens DRC peace Accord, in The Sunday Mail, July 11, 1999,p.11.

[221] M. Rupiya, “The motivations for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), August 1998 to the present: Operation Restore Sovereignty” (unpublished manuscript) p.5.

[222] E. Mahende, “Inga dam: What was at stake”, in The Sunday Mail, September 20,1998,p.9.

[223] B. Peta,  “More deployed as casualties rise”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 28,1998, p.1.

N.B Peta’s article reported that 50 Zimbabwe soldiers had been killed according to what the rebel had reported, however these figures had been refuted on 27 August 1998 by a Press Statement that was issued by the government. Due the fact that newspapers are printed the day before, Peta was unable to notify the development in his article.

[224] K. Sakachira, “Congo offensive holds new dangers”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, October 23,1998,p.3.

[225] Comment, “Allies, forces halt invaders despite proximity”, in ZNA Magazine, May 1999,p.1.

[226] Sun Tzu, The art of war, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1981,p. 90.

[227] Cartoon, “The cost of sustaining Mugabe’s ego”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, September 4,1998,p. 6.

[228]  B. Peta,  “More deployed as casualties rise”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, August 28,1998, p.1.

[229] B. Hungwe, “DRC war casualties shock families; give shocking accounts points”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, April 30, 1999, p. 1.

[230] Staff Writer, “ZNA dispatches 1500 military police to DRC” in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 20, 1998,p. 4.

[231] Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[232] See page 73.

[233] Staff Writer, “ZNA dispatches 1500 military police to DRC” in The Zimbabwe Independent, November 20, 1998,p. 4.

[234]Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[235] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[236] B. Hungwe, “DRC war casualties shock families; give shocking accounts points”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, April 30, 1999, p. 1.

[237] Interview with A. W Tapfumaneyi, 23 March 2007,Chaminuka Building, Harare.

[238] Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[239] D. Muleya, “Who really won in the Congo war?” in The Zimbabwe Independent, July 16,1999,p. 11.

[240][240]Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[241] V. Ruzvidzo, “Zimbabwe troops wont leave DRC” in The Herald, May 5,1999,p.1.

[242] H.Campbell, “Note of the pace of the struggle for a new mode of politics in the Congo,” in Mandaza I (ed.), Reflections on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Harare, Sapes Book, 1999.p.56.

[243] Interview with B. Hungwe (approximate 37) 02 April 2007, Mighty Movies, Harare.

[244] Interview with J. Gutsa (approximate 50) 18 June 2007,Hillside, Harare. 

[245]Interview with B. Ncube approximate age 48), 02 April 2007 Defence House, Harare.

[246] Comment, “Patriotic blinkers movement be discarded”, in The Zimbabwe Independent, December 24,1998,p.6.

[247] Interview with B. Ncube (approximate age 48), April 02,2007 Defence House, Harare.